Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigation

Abstract In this paper, using a dynamic panel of 21 OECD countries, we find that, unlike the other OECD countries in the sample, wage setting institutions, competition conditions, public finances, and external imbalances can account for the behavior of the public sector wage premium (WPR) and the se...

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Main Authors: Tryphon Kollintzas, Dimitris Papageorgiou, Efthymios Tsionas, Vanghelis Vassilatos
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Sciendo 2018-01-01
Series:IZA Journal of Labor Policy
Subjects:
Online Access:http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40173-017-0093-1
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spelling doaj-43faf2f7635745138a19852ec16dc5872021-05-02T04:25:04ZengSciendoIZA Journal of Labor Policy2193-90042018-01-017114310.1186/s40173-017-0093-1Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigationTryphon Kollintzas0Dimitris Papageorgiou1Efthymios Tsionas2Vanghelis Vassilatos3Athens University of Economics and BusinessEconomic Analysis and Research Department, Bank of GreeceAthens University of Economics and BusinessAthens University of Economics and BusinessAbstract In this paper, using a dynamic panel of 21 OECD countries, we find that, unlike the other OECD countries in the sample, wage setting institutions, competition conditions, public finances, and external imbalances can account for the behavior of the public sector wage premium (WPR) and the self-employed taxation gap (TSL) in Greece and to a lesser extent in Spain and Portugal, in a manner that is consistent with an “insider–outsider society” (IOS). That is, a politicoeconomic system characterized by groups of selfish elites that enjoy market power but at the same time cooperate in influencing government in protecting and promoting their collective self-interests. Then, we find that for Greece as well as Spain and Portugal, WPR and TSL have an adverse effect on both TFP and output growth. Finally, the effect of WPR and TSL on the business cycle (shock propagation mechanism) is investigated via a panel VAR analysis. Again, impulse response function analysis suggests that the shock propagation mechanisms of WPR and TSL for Greece and to a lesser extent for Spain and Portugal are quite different from the rest of the OECD countries. For example, in Greece, unlike the other OECD countries in the sample, a positive temporary shock in WPR causes TFP and output to fall and the public and current account deficits to increase. We take the TFP/output growth and the shock propagation mechanism results to provide strong evidence that Greece and to a lesser extent Spain and Portugal behave like IOS. For that matter, these results are important in order to understand the Greek crisis.http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40173-017-0093-1Labor market institutionsPolitical institutionsPublic sector wage premiumSelf-employed taxation gapGrowthBusiness cycles
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Tryphon Kollintzas
Dimitris Papageorgiou
Efthymios Tsionas
Vanghelis Vassilatos
spellingShingle Tryphon Kollintzas
Dimitris Papageorgiou
Efthymios Tsionas
Vanghelis Vassilatos
Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigation
IZA Journal of Labor Policy
Labor market institutions
Political institutions
Public sector wage premium
Self-employed taxation gap
Growth
Business cycles
author_facet Tryphon Kollintzas
Dimitris Papageorgiou
Efthymios Tsionas
Vanghelis Vassilatos
author_sort Tryphon Kollintzas
title Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigation
title_short Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigation
title_full Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigation
title_fullStr Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigation
title_full_unstemmed Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigation
title_sort market and political power interactions in greece: an empirical investigation
publisher Sciendo
series IZA Journal of Labor Policy
issn 2193-9004
publishDate 2018-01-01
description Abstract In this paper, using a dynamic panel of 21 OECD countries, we find that, unlike the other OECD countries in the sample, wage setting institutions, competition conditions, public finances, and external imbalances can account for the behavior of the public sector wage premium (WPR) and the self-employed taxation gap (TSL) in Greece and to a lesser extent in Spain and Portugal, in a manner that is consistent with an “insider–outsider society” (IOS). That is, a politicoeconomic system characterized by groups of selfish elites that enjoy market power but at the same time cooperate in influencing government in protecting and promoting their collective self-interests. Then, we find that for Greece as well as Spain and Portugal, WPR and TSL have an adverse effect on both TFP and output growth. Finally, the effect of WPR and TSL on the business cycle (shock propagation mechanism) is investigated via a panel VAR analysis. Again, impulse response function analysis suggests that the shock propagation mechanisms of WPR and TSL for Greece and to a lesser extent for Spain and Portugal are quite different from the rest of the OECD countries. For example, in Greece, unlike the other OECD countries in the sample, a positive temporary shock in WPR causes TFP and output to fall and the public and current account deficits to increase. We take the TFP/output growth and the shock propagation mechanism results to provide strong evidence that Greece and to a lesser extent Spain and Portugal behave like IOS. For that matter, these results are important in order to understand the Greek crisis.
topic Labor market institutions
Political institutions
Public sector wage premium
Self-employed taxation gap
Growth
Business cycles
url http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40173-017-0093-1
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