Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of being in control of one's actions. Previous research has demonstrated that sense of agency is produced through the sensorimotor system, which is involved in comparing internal predictions with sensory feedback in motor control. Therefore, sensorimotor de...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yu Miyawaki, Takeshi Otani, Shu Morioka
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2020-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230603
id doaj-434df0ac94fc4e60bcd3223070c6a965
record_format Article
spelling doaj-434df0ac94fc4e60bcd3223070c6a9652021-03-03T21:38:23ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032020-01-01153e023060310.1371/journal.pone.0230603Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.Yu MiyawakiTakeshi OtaniShu MoriokaSense of agency refers to the feeling of being in control of one's actions. Previous research has demonstrated that sense of agency is produced through the sensorimotor system, which is involved in comparing internal predictions with sensory feedback in motor control. Therefore, sensorimotor deficits might impair agency through a sensorimotor system malfunction. The present study examined this hypothesis by investigating post-stroke patients who had suffered a subcortical stroke that damaged regions associated with sensorimotor function. To examine agency judgments with respect to motor control, we adopted a self-other attribution task and applied it to post-stroke patients. Participants traced a horizontal straight line and received visual feedback through a cursor on a monitor. The cursor movement reflected either the participants' actual movement or the movement of an "other" that had been previously recorded. Participants judged whether the cursor movement reflected their own movement (self) or an other's movement while they engaged in four cycles of the horizontal tracing movement. After each trial, participants reported their self-other judgment on a nine-point scale. Post-stroke patients completed the experiment with their paretic as well as their non-paralyzed upper limbs. Compared to healthy controls, patients made significantly more self-attributions of others' movements. Interestingly, such misattributions were observed in the patients' performance using both paretic and non-paralyzed upper limbs. These results suggest that post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits form misattributions that cannot be explained solely by the sensorimotor system's role in motor control. We discuss these misattributions in post-stroke patients in terms of cue integration theory.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230603
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Yu Miyawaki
Takeshi Otani
Shu Morioka
spellingShingle Yu Miyawaki
Takeshi Otani
Shu Morioka
Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.
PLoS ONE
author_facet Yu Miyawaki
Takeshi Otani
Shu Morioka
author_sort Yu Miyawaki
title Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.
title_short Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.
title_full Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.
title_fullStr Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.
title_full_unstemmed Agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.
title_sort agency judgments in post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS ONE
issn 1932-6203
publishDate 2020-01-01
description Sense of agency refers to the feeling of being in control of one's actions. Previous research has demonstrated that sense of agency is produced through the sensorimotor system, which is involved in comparing internal predictions with sensory feedback in motor control. Therefore, sensorimotor deficits might impair agency through a sensorimotor system malfunction. The present study examined this hypothesis by investigating post-stroke patients who had suffered a subcortical stroke that damaged regions associated with sensorimotor function. To examine agency judgments with respect to motor control, we adopted a self-other attribution task and applied it to post-stroke patients. Participants traced a horizontal straight line and received visual feedback through a cursor on a monitor. The cursor movement reflected either the participants' actual movement or the movement of an "other" that had been previously recorded. Participants judged whether the cursor movement reflected their own movement (self) or an other's movement while they engaged in four cycles of the horizontal tracing movement. After each trial, participants reported their self-other judgment on a nine-point scale. Post-stroke patients completed the experiment with their paretic as well as their non-paralyzed upper limbs. Compared to healthy controls, patients made significantly more self-attributions of others' movements. Interestingly, such misattributions were observed in the patients' performance using both paretic and non-paralyzed upper limbs. These results suggest that post-stroke patients with sensorimotor deficits form misattributions that cannot be explained solely by the sensorimotor system's role in motor control. We discuss these misattributions in post-stroke patients in terms of cue integration theory.
url https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230603
work_keys_str_mv AT yumiyawaki agencyjudgmentsinpoststrokepatientswithsensorimotordeficits
AT takeshiotani agencyjudgmentsinpoststrokepatientswithsensorimotordeficits
AT shumorioka agencyjudgmentsinpoststrokepatientswithsensorimotordeficits
_version_ 1714815868511191040