The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations

Extreme environmental variations, as a phenomenon deriving from climate change, led to an exacerbated uncertainty on water availability and increased the likelihood of conflicts regarding water-dependent activities such as agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of conflict resolution me...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ana Alicia Dipierri, Dimitrios Zikos
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-12-01
Series:Sustainability
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/24/10526
id doaj-40eb2cab7aaa4eba8041c834345ac439
record_format Article
spelling doaj-40eb2cab7aaa4eba8041c834345ac4392020-12-17T00:01:33ZengMDPI AGSustainability2071-10502020-12-0112105261052610.3390/su122410526The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental VariationsAna Alicia Dipierri0Dimitrios Zikos1Centre E. Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Université libre de Bruxelles, Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50 CP 139, B-1050 Brussels, BelgiumInternational Development and Economics Programme, Department of Economics, HTW University of Applied Sciences, Treskowallee 8, 10318 Berlin, GermanyExtreme environmental variations, as a phenomenon deriving from climate change, led to an exacerbated uncertainty on water availability and increased the likelihood of conflicts regarding water-dependent activities such as agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of conflict resolution mechanisms—one of Ostrom’s acclaimed Design Principles—when social-ecological systems are exposed to physical external disturbances. The theoretical propositions predict that social-ecological systems with conflict-resolution mechanisms will perform better than those without them. We tested this proposition through a framed field experiment that mimicked an irrigation system. This asymmetric setting exposed farmers to two (2) dilemmas: (i) how much to invest in the communal irrigation system’s maintenance and (ii) how much water to extract. The setting added a layer of complexity: water availability depended not only on the investment but also on the environmental variability. Our findings confirmed the theoretical proposition: groups with stronger ‘institutional robustness’ can cope with environmental variations better than those with weaker robustness. However, we also found that some groups, despite lacking conflict-resolution mechanisms, were also able to address environmental variations. We explored potential explanatory variables to these unexpected results. We found that subjects’ and groups’ attributes might address uncertainty and avert conflict. Thus, social-ecological systems’ capacity to respond to external disturbances, such as environmental variations, might not only be a question of Design Principles. Instead, it might also be strongly related to group members’ attributes and group dynamics. Our results pave the way for further research, hinting that some groups might be better equipped for mitigation measures, while others might be better equipped for adaptation measures.https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/24/10526irrigation systemscommon-pool resource managementenvironmental variabilitycollective action<i>institutional robustness</i>
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Ana Alicia Dipierri
Dimitrios Zikos
spellingShingle Ana Alicia Dipierri
Dimitrios Zikos
The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations
Sustainability
irrigation systems
common-pool resource management
environmental variability
collective action
<i>institutional robustness</i>
author_facet Ana Alicia Dipierri
Dimitrios Zikos
author_sort Ana Alicia Dipierri
title The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations
title_short The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations
title_full The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations
title_fullStr The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations
title_full_unstemmed The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations
title_sort role of common-pool resources’ institutional robustness in a collective action dilemma under environmental variations
publisher MDPI AG
series Sustainability
issn 2071-1050
publishDate 2020-12-01
description Extreme environmental variations, as a phenomenon deriving from climate change, led to an exacerbated uncertainty on water availability and increased the likelihood of conflicts regarding water-dependent activities such as agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of conflict resolution mechanisms—one of Ostrom’s acclaimed Design Principles—when social-ecological systems are exposed to physical external disturbances. The theoretical propositions predict that social-ecological systems with conflict-resolution mechanisms will perform better than those without them. We tested this proposition through a framed field experiment that mimicked an irrigation system. This asymmetric setting exposed farmers to two (2) dilemmas: (i) how much to invest in the communal irrigation system’s maintenance and (ii) how much water to extract. The setting added a layer of complexity: water availability depended not only on the investment but also on the environmental variability. Our findings confirmed the theoretical proposition: groups with stronger ‘institutional robustness’ can cope with environmental variations better than those with weaker robustness. However, we also found that some groups, despite lacking conflict-resolution mechanisms, were also able to address environmental variations. We explored potential explanatory variables to these unexpected results. We found that subjects’ and groups’ attributes might address uncertainty and avert conflict. Thus, social-ecological systems’ capacity to respond to external disturbances, such as environmental variations, might not only be a question of Design Principles. Instead, it might also be strongly related to group members’ attributes and group dynamics. Our results pave the way for further research, hinting that some groups might be better equipped for mitigation measures, while others might be better equipped for adaptation measures.
topic irrigation systems
common-pool resource management
environmental variability
collective action
<i>institutional robustness</i>
url https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/24/10526
work_keys_str_mv AT anaaliciadipierri theroleofcommonpoolresourcesinstitutionalrobustnessinacollectiveactiondilemmaunderenvironmentalvariations
AT dimitrioszikos theroleofcommonpoolresourcesinstitutionalrobustnessinacollectiveactiondilemmaunderenvironmentalvariations
AT anaaliciadipierri roleofcommonpoolresourcesinstitutionalrobustnessinacollectiveactiondilemmaunderenvironmentalvariations
AT dimitrioszikos roleofcommonpoolresourcesinstitutionalrobustnessinacollectiveactiondilemmaunderenvironmentalvariations
_version_ 1724380776998371328