The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations
Extreme environmental variations, as a phenomenon deriving from climate change, led to an exacerbated uncertainty on water availability and increased the likelihood of conflicts regarding water-dependent activities such as agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of conflict resolution me...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2020-12-01
|
Series: | Sustainability |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/24/10526 |
id |
doaj-40eb2cab7aaa4eba8041c834345ac439 |
---|---|
record_format |
Article |
spelling |
doaj-40eb2cab7aaa4eba8041c834345ac4392020-12-17T00:01:33ZengMDPI AGSustainability2071-10502020-12-0112105261052610.3390/su122410526The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental VariationsAna Alicia Dipierri0Dimitrios Zikos1Centre E. Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Université libre de Bruxelles, Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50 CP 139, B-1050 Brussels, BelgiumInternational Development and Economics Programme, Department of Economics, HTW University of Applied Sciences, Treskowallee 8, 10318 Berlin, GermanyExtreme environmental variations, as a phenomenon deriving from climate change, led to an exacerbated uncertainty on water availability and increased the likelihood of conflicts regarding water-dependent activities such as agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of conflict resolution mechanisms—one of Ostrom’s acclaimed Design Principles—when social-ecological systems are exposed to physical external disturbances. The theoretical propositions predict that social-ecological systems with conflict-resolution mechanisms will perform better than those without them. We tested this proposition through a framed field experiment that mimicked an irrigation system. This asymmetric setting exposed farmers to two (2) dilemmas: (i) how much to invest in the communal irrigation system’s maintenance and (ii) how much water to extract. The setting added a layer of complexity: water availability depended not only on the investment but also on the environmental variability. Our findings confirmed the theoretical proposition: groups with stronger ‘institutional robustness’ can cope with environmental variations better than those with weaker robustness. However, we also found that some groups, despite lacking conflict-resolution mechanisms, were also able to address environmental variations. We explored potential explanatory variables to these unexpected results. We found that subjects’ and groups’ attributes might address uncertainty and avert conflict. Thus, social-ecological systems’ capacity to respond to external disturbances, such as environmental variations, might not only be a question of Design Principles. Instead, it might also be strongly related to group members’ attributes and group dynamics. Our results pave the way for further research, hinting that some groups might be better equipped for mitigation measures, while others might be better equipped for adaptation measures.https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/24/10526irrigation systemscommon-pool resource managementenvironmental variabilitycollective action<i>institutional robustness</i> |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Ana Alicia Dipierri Dimitrios Zikos |
spellingShingle |
Ana Alicia Dipierri Dimitrios Zikos The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations Sustainability irrigation systems common-pool resource management environmental variability collective action <i>institutional robustness</i> |
author_facet |
Ana Alicia Dipierri Dimitrios Zikos |
author_sort |
Ana Alicia Dipierri |
title |
The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations |
title_short |
The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations |
title_full |
The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations |
title_fullStr |
The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations |
title_sort |
role of common-pool resources’ institutional robustness in a collective action dilemma under environmental variations |
publisher |
MDPI AG |
series |
Sustainability |
issn |
2071-1050 |
publishDate |
2020-12-01 |
description |
Extreme environmental variations, as a phenomenon deriving from climate change, led to an exacerbated uncertainty on water availability and increased the likelihood of conflicts regarding water-dependent activities such as agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of conflict resolution mechanisms—one of Ostrom’s acclaimed Design Principles—when social-ecological systems are exposed to physical external disturbances. The theoretical propositions predict that social-ecological systems with conflict-resolution mechanisms will perform better than those without them. We tested this proposition through a framed field experiment that mimicked an irrigation system. This asymmetric setting exposed farmers to two (2) dilemmas: (i) how much to invest in the communal irrigation system’s maintenance and (ii) how much water to extract. The setting added a layer of complexity: water availability depended not only on the investment but also on the environmental variability. Our findings confirmed the theoretical proposition: groups with stronger ‘institutional robustness’ can cope with environmental variations better than those with weaker robustness. However, we also found that some groups, despite lacking conflict-resolution mechanisms, were also able to address environmental variations. We explored potential explanatory variables to these unexpected results. We found that subjects’ and groups’ attributes might address uncertainty and avert conflict. Thus, social-ecological systems’ capacity to respond to external disturbances, such as environmental variations, might not only be a question of Design Principles. Instead, it might also be strongly related to group members’ attributes and group dynamics. Our results pave the way for further research, hinting that some groups might be better equipped for mitigation measures, while others might be better equipped for adaptation measures. |
topic |
irrigation systems common-pool resource management environmental variability collective action <i>institutional robustness</i> |
url |
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/24/10526 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT anaaliciadipierri theroleofcommonpoolresourcesinstitutionalrobustnessinacollectiveactiondilemmaunderenvironmentalvariations AT dimitrioszikos theroleofcommonpoolresourcesinstitutionalrobustnessinacollectiveactiondilemmaunderenvironmentalvariations AT anaaliciadipierri roleofcommonpoolresourcesinstitutionalrobustnessinacollectiveactiondilemmaunderenvironmentalvariations AT dimitrioszikos roleofcommonpoolresourcesinstitutionalrobustnessinacollectiveactiondilemmaunderenvironmentalvariations |
_version_ |
1724380776998371328 |