Discrete Infinity and the Syntax-semantics Interface

<p>Discrete infnity was identifed as a central feature of human language by Humboldt who famously spoke of making infnite use of fnite means. Later Chomsky refocused attention on this property starting with Chomsky (1957). In a number of works since, Chomsky has repeatedly stressed the central...

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Main Authors: Uli Sauerland, Pooja Paul
Format: Article
Language:Portuguese
Published: Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2017-09-01
Series:Revista Linguística
Online Access:https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rl/article/view/14031
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spelling doaj-40ca6266c95247869b0605b36569cb222020-11-24T23:49:21ZporUniversidade Federal do Rio de JaneiroRevista Linguística1808-835X2238-975X2017-09-01132283410.31513/linguistica.2017.v13n2a140318854Discrete Infinity and the Syntax-semantics InterfaceUli Sauerland0Pooja Paul1Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (ZAS)Harvard University<p>Discrete infnity was identifed as a central feature of human language by Humboldt who famously spoke of making infnite use of fnite means. Later Chomsky refocused attention on this property starting with Chomsky (1957). In a number of works since, Chomsky has repeatedly stressed the centrality of infnity for understanding language. For example, Chomsky (2007) writes that “An I-language is a computational system that generates infnitely many internal expressions”. Chomsky also noted that the property of discrete infnity is shared by the natural numbers and language. This connection has also caught the interest of others in cognitive science (e.g. Dehaene 1999, Dehaene et al. 1999). In this squib, we want to discuss concrete reductions of discrete infnity of the natural number. Specifcally, we want to investigate the extent to which this connection is compatible with current views of the syntax-semantics interface. We argue that merge alone is not enough to derive infnity, but a minimal lexicon is necessary, as Chomsky (2007) has noted in passing. We furthermore show that Chomsky’s assertion that a single lexical item is sufcient to generate the natural numbers depends on two assumptions -- an untyped lambda calculus, and a specifc interpretation of the syntactic Merge operation.</p><p> </p><p>---</p><p>DOI: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31513/linguistica.2017.v13n2a14031" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.31513/linguistica.2017.v13n2a14031</a></p>https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rl/article/view/14031
collection DOAJ
language Portuguese
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Uli Sauerland
Pooja Paul
spellingShingle Uli Sauerland
Pooja Paul
Discrete Infinity and the Syntax-semantics Interface
Revista Linguística
author_facet Uli Sauerland
Pooja Paul
author_sort Uli Sauerland
title Discrete Infinity and the Syntax-semantics Interface
title_short Discrete Infinity and the Syntax-semantics Interface
title_full Discrete Infinity and the Syntax-semantics Interface
title_fullStr Discrete Infinity and the Syntax-semantics Interface
title_full_unstemmed Discrete Infinity and the Syntax-semantics Interface
title_sort discrete infinity and the syntax-semantics interface
publisher Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
series Revista Linguística
issn 1808-835X
2238-975X
publishDate 2017-09-01
description <p>Discrete infnity was identifed as a central feature of human language by Humboldt who famously spoke of making infnite use of fnite means. Later Chomsky refocused attention on this property starting with Chomsky (1957). In a number of works since, Chomsky has repeatedly stressed the centrality of infnity for understanding language. For example, Chomsky (2007) writes that “An I-language is a computational system that generates infnitely many internal expressions”. Chomsky also noted that the property of discrete infnity is shared by the natural numbers and language. This connection has also caught the interest of others in cognitive science (e.g. Dehaene 1999, Dehaene et al. 1999). In this squib, we want to discuss concrete reductions of discrete infnity of the natural number. Specifcally, we want to investigate the extent to which this connection is compatible with current views of the syntax-semantics interface. We argue that merge alone is not enough to derive infnity, but a minimal lexicon is necessary, as Chomsky (2007) has noted in passing. We furthermore show that Chomsky’s assertion that a single lexical item is sufcient to generate the natural numbers depends on two assumptions -- an untyped lambda calculus, and a specifc interpretation of the syntactic Merge operation.</p><p> </p><p>---</p><p>DOI: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31513/linguistica.2017.v13n2a14031" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.31513/linguistica.2017.v13n2a14031</a></p>
url https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rl/article/view/14031
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