Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection

Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection

In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct. Neces...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Eugenio Vicario
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2021-04-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
local interactions
coordination games
learning
mutations
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/30
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spelling doaj-3fafa174b2b241d48351ceb8bb83f1e22021-04-01T23:01:05ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362021-04-0112303010.3390/g12020030Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium SelectionEugenio Vicario0Department of Economics and Management, University of Florence, Via Delle Pandette 9, 50127 Florence, ItalyIn this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct. Necessary and sufficient conditions for both the actions to be the unique long run equilibrium are provided. The result is obtained through the application of the radius and modified coradius technique.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/30local interactionscoordination gameslearningmutations
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Eugenio Vicario
spellingShingle Eugenio Vicario
Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection
Games
local interactions
coordination games
learning
mutations
author_facet Eugenio Vicario
author_sort Eugenio Vicario
title Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection
title_short Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection
title_full Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection
title_fullStr Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection
title_full_unstemmed Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection
title_sort imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection
publisher MDPI AG
series Games
issn 2073-4336
publishDate 2021-04-01
description In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct. Necessary and sufficient conditions for both the actions to be the unique long run equilibrium are provided. The result is obtained through the application of the radius and modified coradius technique.
topic local interactions
coordination games
learning
mutations
url https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/30
work_keys_str_mv AT eugeniovicario imitationandlocalinteractionslongrunequilibriumselection
_version_ 1724175774087380992

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