Survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systems

Over the last decade, the number of cyber attacks targeting power systems and causing physical and economic damages has increased rapidly. Among them, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are a class of cyber-attacks against power grid monitoring systems. Adversaries can successfully perform FDIAs t...

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Main Authors: Ali Sayghe, Yaodan Hu, Ioannis Zografopoulos, XiaoRui Liu, Raj Gautam Dutta, Yier Jin, Charalambos Konstantinou
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2020-10-01
Series:IET Smart Grid
Subjects:
Online Access:https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-stg.2020.0015
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spelling doaj-3f6b7f560d0243d1aa1f5935ba4a25a92021-04-02T13:20:42ZengWileyIET Smart Grid2515-29472020-10-0110.1049/iet-stg.2020.0015IET-STG.2020.0015Survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systemsAli Sayghe0Yaodan Hu1Yaodan Hu2Ioannis Zografopoulos3XiaoRui Liu4Raj Gautam Dutta5Yier Jin6Charalambos Konstantinou7FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, Center for Advanced Power Systems, Florida State UniversityDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of FloridaDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of FloridaFAMU-FSU College of Engineering, Center for Advanced Power Systems, Florida State UniversityFAMU-FSU College of Engineering, Center for Advanced Power Systems, Florida State UniversityDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of FloridaDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of FloridaFAMU-FSU College of Engineering, Center for Advanced Power Systems, Florida State UniversityOver the last decade, the number of cyber attacks targeting power systems and causing physical and economic damages has increased rapidly. Among them, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are a class of cyber-attacks against power grid monitoring systems. Adversaries can successfully perform FDIAs to manipulate the power system state estimation (SE) by compromising sensors or modifying system data. SE is an essential process performed by the energy management system towards estimating unknown state variables based on system redundant measurements and network topology. SE routines include bad data detection algorithms to eliminate errors from the acquired measurements, e.g. in case of sensor failures. FDIAs can bypass BDD modules to inject malicious data vectors into a subset of measurements without being detected, and thus manipulate the results of the SE process. To overcome the limitations of traditional residual-based BDD approaches, data-driven solutions based on machine learning algorithms have been widely adopted for detecting malicious manipulation of sensor data due to their fast execution times and accurate results. This study provides a comprehensive review of the most up-to-date machine learning methods for detecting FDIAs against power system SE algorithms.https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-stg.2020.0015security of datapower gridspower system securitypower engineering computingpower system measurementenergy management systemspower system state estimationbinary decision diagramslearning (artificial intelligence)power system state estimationsystem dataenergy management systemunknown state variablessystem redundant measurementsdata detection algorithmsfdiamalicious data vectorsdata-driven solutionsmachine learning algorithmssensor datapower system se algorithmsfalse data injection attackspower systemscyber attackscyber-attackspower grid monitoring systems
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Ali Sayghe
Yaodan Hu
Yaodan Hu
Ioannis Zografopoulos
XiaoRui Liu
Raj Gautam Dutta
Yier Jin
Charalambos Konstantinou
spellingShingle Ali Sayghe
Yaodan Hu
Yaodan Hu
Ioannis Zografopoulos
XiaoRui Liu
Raj Gautam Dutta
Yier Jin
Charalambos Konstantinou
Survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systems
IET Smart Grid
security of data
power grids
power system security
power engineering computing
power system measurement
energy management systems
power system state estimation
binary decision diagrams
learning (artificial intelligence)
power system state estimation
system data
energy management system
unknown state variables
system redundant measurements
data detection algorithms
fdia
malicious data vectors
data-driven solutions
machine learning algorithms
sensor data
power system se algorithms
false data injection attacks
power systems
cyber attacks
cyber-attacks
power grid monitoring systems
author_facet Ali Sayghe
Yaodan Hu
Yaodan Hu
Ioannis Zografopoulos
XiaoRui Liu
Raj Gautam Dutta
Yier Jin
Charalambos Konstantinou
author_sort Ali Sayghe
title Survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systems
title_short Survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systems
title_full Survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systems
title_fullStr Survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systems
title_full_unstemmed Survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systems
title_sort survey of machine learning methods for detecting false data injection attacks in power systems
publisher Wiley
series IET Smart Grid
issn 2515-2947
publishDate 2020-10-01
description Over the last decade, the number of cyber attacks targeting power systems and causing physical and economic damages has increased rapidly. Among them, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are a class of cyber-attacks against power grid monitoring systems. Adversaries can successfully perform FDIAs to manipulate the power system state estimation (SE) by compromising sensors or modifying system data. SE is an essential process performed by the energy management system towards estimating unknown state variables based on system redundant measurements and network topology. SE routines include bad data detection algorithms to eliminate errors from the acquired measurements, e.g. in case of sensor failures. FDIAs can bypass BDD modules to inject malicious data vectors into a subset of measurements without being detected, and thus manipulate the results of the SE process. To overcome the limitations of traditional residual-based BDD approaches, data-driven solutions based on machine learning algorithms have been widely adopted for detecting malicious manipulation of sensor data due to their fast execution times and accurate results. This study provides a comprehensive review of the most up-to-date machine learning methods for detecting FDIAs against power system SE algorithms.
topic security of data
power grids
power system security
power engineering computing
power system measurement
energy management systems
power system state estimation
binary decision diagrams
learning (artificial intelligence)
power system state estimation
system data
energy management system
unknown state variables
system redundant measurements
data detection algorithms
fdia
malicious data vectors
data-driven solutions
machine learning algorithms
sensor data
power system se algorithms
false data injection attacks
power systems
cyber attacks
cyber-attacks
power grid monitoring systems
url https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-stg.2020.0015
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