Assessment of Wittgenstein's Resolution to the Negative Facts
he essay tries to evaluate Wittgenstein's resolution to the riddle of Russell's negative facts. That is, when we say, for example, "Tehran is not the capital of Ireland" is true, what kind of truth–maker should we consider for the negative proposition because of its truth? Surely...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Tabriz
2016-08-01
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| Series: | Philosophical Investigations |
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| Online Access: | http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_5751.html |
| Summary: | he essay tries to evaluate Wittgenstein's resolution to the riddle of Russell's negative facts. That is, when we say, for example, "Tehran is not the capital of Ireland" is true, what kind of truth–maker should we consider for the negative proposition because of its truth? Surely, a negative truth–maker is so problematic and counter–intuitive. Therefore, Wittgenstein has tried to show how it can be returned to the positive truth–makers. Thus, the paper first analyzes Wittgenstein's general resolutions to the nonexistent. Then it focuses on his special resolution to the negative facts riddle, i.e. Tractatus 2.05: "The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do not exist". Finally, after refuting some philosophers' criticisms, it shows his resolution's positive points and possible lacks. |
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| ISSN: | 2251-7960 2423-4419 |