Retailer Stackelberg game in a supply chain with pricing and service decisions and simple price discount contract.

• Main Authors: Seyed Jafar Sadjadi, Hashem Asadi, Ramin Sadeghian, Hadi Sahebi
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2018-01-01
• Series: PLoS ONE
• Online Access: http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC5896922?pdf=render

This paper studies the Retailer Stackelberg game in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer where they compete simultaneously under three factors including price, service and simple price discount contract. It is assumed that the second manufacturer provides service directly to his customers, and the retailer provides service for the first product's customers, while the retailer buys the first product under price discount from the first manufacturer. The analysis of the optimal equilibrium solutions and the results of the numerical examples show that if a manufacturer chooses the appropriate range of discount rate, he will gain more profit than when there is no discount given to the retailer. This situation can be considered as an effective tool for the coordination of the first manufacturer and the retailer to offer discount by manufacturer and to provide the service by the retailer. We obtain equilibrium solution of Retailer Stackelberg game and analyze the numerical examples under two cases: a) the manufacturers sell their products to the retailer without price discount contract. b) The first manufacturer sells his products to the retailer with the simple price discount contract. The preliminary results show that the service and the price discount contract can improve the performance of supply chain.