Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic Dilemma

Critiques of Western feminists’ attempts to extend claims about gender injustice to the global context highlighted a dilemma facing Western feminists, what I call the global gender justice dilemma. In response to this dilemma, Alison M. Jaggar argues that Western feminists should turn our attention...

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Main Author: Corwin Aragon
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Western Ontario 2019-07-01
Series:Feminist Philosophy Quarterly
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/fpq/article/view/7294
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spelling doaj-3b2e3025b66941af8980c13654ae7b972021-09-10T21:58:44ZengUniversity of Western OntarioFeminist Philosophy Quarterly2371-25702019-07-015210.5206/fpq/2019.2.7294Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic DilemmaCorwin Aragon0California State Polytechnic University, Pomona Critiques of Western feminists’ attempts to extend claims about gender injustice to the global context highlighted a dilemma facing Western feminists, what I call the global gender justice dilemma. In response to this dilemma, Alison M. Jaggar argues that Western feminists should turn our attention away from trying to resolve it and, instead, toward examination of our own complicity in the processes that produce injustice. I suggest that this kind of approach is helpful in responding to an additional dilemma that confronts the Western feminist, namely the epistemic dilemma. Western feminists can speak for women of the global South and run the risk of distorting those women’s experience and further silencing their voices, or we can refuse to speak and abdicate our responsibilities to address injustice. I argue that we should address this dilemma not by trying to resolve it but by examining our role in the reproduction of epistemically unjust practices. To explain this response, I offer a preliminary account of epistemic injustice as epistemic oppression. I conclude by claiming that our own epistemic complicity in epistemically oppressive social practices is a weighty reason for us to work to transform those practices. https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/fpq/article/view/7294epistemic injustice, epistemic oppression, structural injustice, structural responsibility, complicity, global gender justice
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Corwin Aragon
spellingShingle Corwin Aragon
Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic Dilemma
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly
epistemic injustice, epistemic oppression, structural injustice, structural responsibility, complicity, global gender justice
author_facet Corwin Aragon
author_sort Corwin Aragon
title Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic Dilemma
title_short Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic Dilemma
title_full Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic Dilemma
title_fullStr Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic Dilemma
title_full_unstemmed Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic Dilemma
title_sort global gender justice and epistemic oppression: a response to an epistemic dilemma
publisher University of Western Ontario
series Feminist Philosophy Quarterly
issn 2371-2570
publishDate 2019-07-01
description Critiques of Western feminists’ attempts to extend claims about gender injustice to the global context highlighted a dilemma facing Western feminists, what I call the global gender justice dilemma. In response to this dilemma, Alison M. Jaggar argues that Western feminists should turn our attention away from trying to resolve it and, instead, toward examination of our own complicity in the processes that produce injustice. I suggest that this kind of approach is helpful in responding to an additional dilemma that confronts the Western feminist, namely the epistemic dilemma. Western feminists can speak for women of the global South and run the risk of distorting those women’s experience and further silencing their voices, or we can refuse to speak and abdicate our responsibilities to address injustice. I argue that we should address this dilemma not by trying to resolve it but by examining our role in the reproduction of epistemically unjust practices. To explain this response, I offer a preliminary account of epistemic injustice as epistemic oppression. I conclude by claiming that our own epistemic complicity in epistemically oppressive social practices is a weighty reason for us to work to transform those practices.
topic epistemic injustice, epistemic oppression, structural injustice, structural responsibility, complicity, global gender justice
url https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/fpq/article/view/7294
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