DOES DEPOSIT INSURANCE INDUCE MORAL HAZARD? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH CREDIT UNIONS FROM THE STATE OF MINAS GERAIS O SEGURO-DEPÓSITO INDUZ RISCO MORAL? UM ESTUDO EMPÍRICO COM AS COOPERATIVAS DE CRÉDITO DO ESTADO DE MINAS GERAIS

DOES DEPOSIT INSURANCE INDUCE MORAL HAZARD? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH CREDIT UNIONS FROM THE STATE OF MINAS GERAIS O SEGURO-DEPÓSITO INDUZ RISCO MORAL? UM ESTUDO EMPÍRICO COM AS COOPERATIVAS DE CRÉDITO DO ESTADO DE MINAS GERAIS

The deposit insurance mechanism is aimed at the security and liquidity of the financial system. But, paradoxically,  it may end up increasing the instability of  the financial system as a result of  themoral hazard problem. In fact, conflicting interests of the parties coupled with imperfect monitor...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Valéria Gama Fully Bressan, Marcelo José Braga, Moisés de Andrade Resende Filho, Aureliano Angel Bressan
Format: Article
Language:Portuguese
Published: Emerald Publishing 2013-01-01
Series:REGE Revista de Gestão
Subjects:
Risco Moral, Seguro Depósito, Cooperativas de Crédito, Adequação de Capital.
Online Access:http://www.revistas.usp.br/rege/article/view/49914

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