RETHINKING THE BLACK SEA: BETWEEN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC AND THE EURASIAN PROJECTS

<p>The Black Sea region as a buffer between great powers and cordon sanitaire was and still is important in European history. After the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Russian empire began a gradual but unstoppable move towards the conquest of the region, leading to a setback for Turk...

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Main Author: Şerban Filip Cioculescu
Format: Article
Language:Afrikaans
Published: Stellenbosch University 2013-06-01
Series:Scientia Militaria
Online Access:http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1051
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spelling doaj-3a4687e3df274d0cbd843e8d981907ae2020-11-25T01:13:27ZafrStellenbosch UniversityScientia Militaria2224-00202013-06-0141110.5787/41-1-1051RETHINKING THE BLACK SEA: BETWEEN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC AND THE EURASIAN PROJECTSŞerban Filip Cioculescu<p>The Black Sea region as a buffer between great powers and cordon sanitaire was and still is important in European history. After the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Russian empire began a gradual but unstoppable move towards the conquest of the region, leading to a setback for Turkish influence. The Crimean War enabled Western powers to contain Russian expansion for some decades. For small and medium-sized countries like Romania, it is difficult to erase historic experiences from their collective memory. During the Cold War, the Black Sea was a virtual “Soviet lake” from a military point of view. The West controlled only the straits “owned” by Turkey following the Montreux Convention. After the implosion of the USSR, this strategic area was neglected by the Western powers and viewed by the Russian Federation as a traditional sphere of influence. Since 1991, Ukraine holds about 30% of the northern shore of the Black Sea, Georgia controls roughly 12% of the maritime littoral (including the separatist territories) while Russia owns about 13% of the Black Sea shores. Turkey and Ukraine hold the biggest share of the Black Sea shore. Generally speaking, during the two last decades, there have been two competing visions about the future: the Euro-Atlantic one, which insists on opening and internationalising the sea, and the Eurasian vision, which wants the Black Sea to remain closed and impenetrable to foreign interferences. This article deals with these issues.</p>doi: 10.5787/41-1-1051http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1051
collection DOAJ
language Afrikaans
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Şerban Filip Cioculescu
spellingShingle Şerban Filip Cioculescu
RETHINKING THE BLACK SEA: BETWEEN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC AND THE EURASIAN PROJECTS
Scientia Militaria
author_facet Şerban Filip Cioculescu
author_sort Şerban Filip Cioculescu
title RETHINKING THE BLACK SEA: BETWEEN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC AND THE EURASIAN PROJECTS
title_short RETHINKING THE BLACK SEA: BETWEEN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC AND THE EURASIAN PROJECTS
title_full RETHINKING THE BLACK SEA: BETWEEN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC AND THE EURASIAN PROJECTS
title_fullStr RETHINKING THE BLACK SEA: BETWEEN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC AND THE EURASIAN PROJECTS
title_full_unstemmed RETHINKING THE BLACK SEA: BETWEEN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC AND THE EURASIAN PROJECTS
title_sort rethinking the black sea: between the trans-atlantic and the eurasian projects
publisher Stellenbosch University
series Scientia Militaria
issn 2224-0020
publishDate 2013-06-01
description <p>The Black Sea region as a buffer between great powers and cordon sanitaire was and still is important in European history. After the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Russian empire began a gradual but unstoppable move towards the conquest of the region, leading to a setback for Turkish influence. The Crimean War enabled Western powers to contain Russian expansion for some decades. For small and medium-sized countries like Romania, it is difficult to erase historic experiences from their collective memory. During the Cold War, the Black Sea was a virtual “Soviet lake” from a military point of view. The West controlled only the straits “owned” by Turkey following the Montreux Convention. After the implosion of the USSR, this strategic area was neglected by the Western powers and viewed by the Russian Federation as a traditional sphere of influence. Since 1991, Ukraine holds about 30% of the northern shore of the Black Sea, Georgia controls roughly 12% of the maritime littoral (including the separatist territories) while Russia owns about 13% of the Black Sea shores. Turkey and Ukraine hold the biggest share of the Black Sea shore. Generally speaking, during the two last decades, there have been two competing visions about the future: the Euro-Atlantic one, which insists on opening and internationalising the sea, and the Eurasian vision, which wants the Black Sea to remain closed and impenetrable to foreign interferences. This article deals with these issues.</p>doi: 10.5787/41-1-1051
url http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1051
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