Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm

Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm

I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of subg...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Marek Mikolaj Kaminski
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2019-08-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
subgame perfect equilibrium
backward induction
refinement
axiomatic game theory
agenda setter
imperfect information
political economy
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/10/3/34

Internet

https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/10/3/34

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