A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions

We study a first-price auction with two bidders where one bidder is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., a concave power function) while the other has a general concave utility function. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal strategic markups...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Mingming Gong, Shulin Liu
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	Hindawi Limited 2021-01-01
Series:	Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402

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spelling	doaj-38c68be80f05467b8a685cd9a85294a62021-09-20T00:29:37ZengHindawi LimitedDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/5592402A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility FunctionsMingming Gong0Shulin Liu1School of International Trade and EconomicsSchool of International Trade and EconomicsWe study a first-price auction with two bidders where one bidder is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., a concave power function) while the other has a general concave utility function. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal strategic markups and analyze the effects of one bidder’s risk aversion level on the optimal strategic markups of him and his opponent’s, the allocative efficiency of the auction, and the seller’s expected revenue, respectively.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402
collection	DOAJ
language	English
format	Article
sources	DOAJ
author	Mingming Gong Shulin Liu
spellingShingle	Mingming Gong Shulin Liu A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
author_facet	Mingming Gong Shulin Liu
author_sort	Mingming Gong
title	A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions
title_short	A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions
title_full	A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions
title_fullStr	A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions
title_full_unstemmed	A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions
title_sort	first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective crra and general utility functions
publisher	Hindawi Limited
series	Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
issn	1607-887X
publishDate	2021-01-01
description	We study a first-price auction with two bidders where one bidder is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., a concave power function) while the other has a general concave utility function. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal strategic markups and analyze the effects of one bidder’s risk aversion level on the optimal strategic markups of him and his opponent’s, the allocative efficiency of the auction, and the seller’s expected revenue, respectively.
url	http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402
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A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions

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