Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
To overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framew...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Coimbra University Press
2006-06-01
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| Series: | Notas Económicas |
| Online Access: | https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3648 |
| Summary: | To overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framework. We assume that in an autocracy rulers have a monopoly over the bribes market, whereas in a democracy conflicting groups compete in the bribes market. The models constructed produce results that are compatible with the well-known stylized facts, namely that (1) in a democracy the level of corruption is lower than in an autocracy, although still positive, that (2) in environments where the level of human capital is higher, regimes are closer to democracies and the level of corruption is lower, and that (3) the level of corruption is higher in more regulated economies. |
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| ISSN: | 0872-4733 2183-203X |