Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

Strategic game payoffs often depend on the state of the environment, which in turn can be influenced by game strategies. Here, Tilman et al. develop a general framework for modeling strategic games with environmental feedbacks and analyze case studies from decision-making, ecology, and economics.

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Andrew R. Tilman, Joshua B. Plotkin, Erol Akçay
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Nature Publishing Group 2020-02-01
Series:Nature Communications
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-14531-6
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spelling doaj-3649610c51c849b688e0a5eada39ac0b2021-05-11T08:28:28ZengNature Publishing GroupNature Communications2041-17232020-02-0111111110.1038/s41467-020-14531-6Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacksAndrew R. Tilman0Joshua B. Plotkin1Erol Akçay2Department of Biology, University of PennsylvaniaDepartment of Biology, University of PennsylvaniaDepartment of Biology, University of PennsylvaniaStrategic game payoffs often depend on the state of the environment, which in turn can be influenced by game strategies. Here, Tilman et al. develop a general framework for modeling strategic games with environmental feedbacks and analyze case studies from decision-making, ecology, and economics.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-14531-6
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Andrew R. Tilman
Joshua B. Plotkin
Erol Akçay
spellingShingle Andrew R. Tilman
Joshua B. Plotkin
Erol Akçay
Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
Nature Communications
author_facet Andrew R. Tilman
Joshua B. Plotkin
Erol Akçay
author_sort Andrew R. Tilman
title Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
title_short Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
title_full Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
title_fullStr Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
title_sort evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
publisher Nature Publishing Group
series Nature Communications
issn 2041-1723
publishDate 2020-02-01
description Strategic game payoffs often depend on the state of the environment, which in turn can be influenced by game strategies. Here, Tilman et al. develop a general framework for modeling strategic games with environmental feedbacks and analyze case studies from decision-making, ecology, and economics.
url https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-14531-6
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AT joshuabplotkin evolutionarygameswithenvironmentalfeedbacks
AT erolakcay evolutionarygameswithenvironmentalfeedbacks
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