Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies

Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies

This paper evaluates the conjecture that factory managers may not be offering a cost-minimizing configuration of compensation and workplace amenities by using manager and worker survey data from Better Work Vietnam. Working conditions are found to have a significant positive impact on global life as...

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Main Authors: Paris Adler, Drusilla Brown, Rajeev Dehejia, George Domat, Raymond Robertson
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: The MIT Press 2017-03-01
Series:Asian Development Review
Subjects:
apparel
human resource management
working conditions
Viet Nam
Online Access:https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ADEV_a_00081
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spelling doaj-36014ff0b710478baace3140e25aa13b2020-11-25T02:47:32ZengThe MIT PressAsian Development Review0116-11051996-72412017-03-01341658710.1162/ADEV_a_00081ADEV_a_00081Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management PoliciesParis AdlerDrusilla Brown0Rajeev Dehejia1George DomatRaymond Robertson2Drusilla Brown: Professor, Department of Economics, Tufts University. E-mail: Drusilla.Brown@tufts.eduRajeev Dehejia (corresponding author): Professor, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University. E-mail: rajeev@dehejia.netRaymond Robertson, Professor, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. E-mail: robertson@tamu.eduThis paper evaluates the conjecture that factory managers may not be offering a cost-minimizing configuration of compensation and workplace amenities by using manager and worker survey data from Better Work Vietnam. Working conditions are found to have a significant positive impact on global life assessments and reduce measures of depression and traumatic stress. We find significant deviations in manager perceptions of working conditions from those of workers. These deviations significantly impact a worker's perception of well-being and indicators of mental health. Such deviations may lead the factory manager to underprovide certain workplace amenities relative to the cost-minimizing configuration, which may in part explain the persistence of relatively poor working conditions in developing economies.https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ADEV_a_00081apparelhuman resource managementworking conditionsViet Nam
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Paris Adler
Drusilla Brown
Rajeev Dehejia
George Domat
Raymond Robertson
spellingShingle Paris Adler
Drusilla Brown
Rajeev Dehejia
George Domat
Raymond Robertson
Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
Asian Development Review
apparel
human resource management
working conditions
Viet Nam
author_facet Paris Adler
Drusilla Brown
Rajeev Dehejia
George Domat
Raymond Robertson
author_sort Paris Adler
title Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_short Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_full Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_fullStr Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_full_unstemmed Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_sort do factory managers know what workers want? manager–worker information asymmetries and pareto optimal human resource management policies
publisher The MIT Press
series Asian Development Review
issn 0116-1105
1996-7241
publishDate 2017-03-01
description This paper evaluates the conjecture that factory managers may not be offering a cost-minimizing configuration of compensation and workplace amenities by using manager and worker survey data from Better Work Vietnam. Working conditions are found to have a significant positive impact on global life assessments and reduce measures of depression and traumatic stress. We find significant deviations in manager perceptions of working conditions from those of workers. These deviations significantly impact a worker's perception of well-being and indicators of mental health. Such deviations may lead the factory manager to underprovide certain workplace amenities relative to the cost-minimizing configuration, which may in part explain the persistence of relatively poor working conditions in developing economies.
topic apparel
human resource management
working conditions
Viet Nam
url https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ADEV_a_00081
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