‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model

‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model

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Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Olga Ramírez
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Adam Mickiewicz University 2012-04-01
Series:Ethics in Progress
Subjects:
Meta-ethics
cognitive aspects of morality
Online Access:https://150.254.65.4/index.php/eip/article/view/10452
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spelling doaj-35d9b1e1236f490eb82f745fd56d65d22020-11-25T04:03:10ZdeuAdam Mickiewicz UniversityEthics in Progress2084-92572012-04-013110.14746/eip.2012.1.2‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional ModelOlga Ramírez0Saint Louis UniversityBoghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose analysis requires a somewhat different reconstruction from that which Boghossian offers. A proper account of thick ethical concepts should be able to explain how ‘evaluated’ and ‘evaluation’ are connected.https://150.254.65.4/index.php/eip/article/view/10452Meta-ethicscognitive aspects of morality
collection DOAJ
language deu
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Olga Ramírez
spellingShingle Olga Ramírez
‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model
Ethics in Progress
Meta-ethics
cognitive aspects of morality
author_facet Olga Ramírez
author_sort Olga Ramírez
title ‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model
title_short ‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model
title_full ‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model
title_fullStr ‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model
title_full_unstemmed ‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model
title_sort ‘boghossian’s blind reasoning’, conditionalization, and thick concepts. a functional model
publisher Adam Mickiewicz University
series Ethics in Progress
issn 2084-9257
publishDate 2012-04-01
description Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose analysis requires a somewhat different reconstruction from that which Boghossian offers. A proper account of thick ethical concepts should be able to explain how ‘evaluated’ and ‘evaluation’ are connected.
topic Meta-ethics
cognitive aspects of morality
url https://150.254.65.4/index.php/eip/article/view/10452
work_keys_str_mv AT olgaramirez boghossiansblindreasoningconditionalizationandthickconceptsafunctionalmodel
_version_ 1724441303506223104

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