Policing, databases, and surveillance
Objective to elaborate legal recommendations concerning the access of law enforcement bodies to data bases. Methods dialectical approach to cognition of social phenomena allowing to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the totality of objective and subjecti...
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Tatar Educational Center "TAGLIMAT" Ltd.
2019-03-01
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doaj-34a4b325933a488d848342691c7412172020-11-25T02:04:23ZengTatar Educational Center "TAGLIMAT" Ltd.Aktualʹnye Problemy Èkonomiki i Prava1993-047X2410-03902019-03-011311092110910.21202/1993-047X.13.2019.1.1092-11091993047XPolicing, databases, and surveillanceChristopher Slobogin0Vanderbilt University Law SchoolObjective to elaborate legal recommendations concerning the access of law enforcement bodies to data bases. Methods dialectical approach to cognition of social phenomena allowing to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the totality of objective and subjective factors predetermined the following research methods formallogical comparativelegal and others. Results Databases are full of personal information that law enforcement might find useful. Government access to these databases can be divided into five categories suspectdriven profiledriven eventdriven programdriven and volunteerdriven. This chapter recommends that in addition to any restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment which currently are minimal each type of access should be subject to its own regulatory regime. Suspectdriven access should depend on justification proportionate to the intrusion. Profiledriven access should likewise abide by a proportionality principle but should also be subject to transparency vetting and universality restrictions. Eventdriven access should be cabined by the time and place of the event. Programdriven access should be authorized by legislation and by regulations publicly arrivedat and evenly applied. Information maintained by institutional fiduciaries should not be volunteered unless necessary to forestall an ongoing or imminent serious wrong. Scientific novelty the article suggests the following recommendations on the access of law enforcement bodies to data bases a if a policing agency seeks nonpublic records about an identified person it should have to demonstrate suspicion of wrongdoing proportionate to the intrusion involved b if a law enforcement agency is accessing data for the purpose of executing a profile to identify suspects it should ensure the profile produces the requisite proportionality derived hit rate avoids illegitimate discrimination and uses an understandable algorithm c if policing agencies are relying on a crime rather than a suspect or a profile as the starting point of the investigation the crime should be serious and the number of people investigated kept to the minimum dictated by the time and place of the crime d collections of data needed by law enforcement should be maintained outside of government to the extent consistent with governing needs but wherever maintained they should be authorized by specific legislation and administrative rules transparently and democratically arrived at. nbsp Practical significance the main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used in scientific and educational activities while consideration the issues related to identification suppression and prevention of crimes.http://apel.ieml.ru/storage/archive_articles/9901.pdfPolicing |
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DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Christopher Slobogin |
spellingShingle |
Christopher Slobogin Policing, databases, and surveillance Aktualʹnye Problemy Èkonomiki i Prava Policing |
author_facet |
Christopher Slobogin |
author_sort |
Christopher Slobogin |
title |
Policing, databases, and surveillance |
title_short |
Policing, databases, and surveillance |
title_full |
Policing, databases, and surveillance |
title_fullStr |
Policing, databases, and surveillance |
title_full_unstemmed |
Policing, databases, and surveillance |
title_sort |
policing, databases, and surveillance |
publisher |
Tatar Educational Center "TAGLIMAT" Ltd. |
series |
Aktualʹnye Problemy Èkonomiki i Prava |
issn |
1993-047X 2410-0390 |
publishDate |
2019-03-01 |
description |
Objective to elaborate legal recommendations concerning the access of law enforcement bodies to data bases.
Methods dialectical approach to cognition of social phenomena allowing to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the totality of objective and subjective factors predetermined the following research methods formallogical comparativelegal and others.
Results Databases are full of personal information that law enforcement might find useful. Government access to these databases can be divided into five categories suspectdriven profiledriven eventdriven programdriven and volunteerdriven. This chapter recommends that in addition to any restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment which currently are minimal each type of access should be subject to its own regulatory regime. Suspectdriven access should depend on justification proportionate to the intrusion. Profiledriven access should likewise abide by a proportionality principle but should also be subject to transparency vetting and universality restrictions. Eventdriven access should be cabined by the time and place of the event. Programdriven access should be authorized by legislation and by regulations publicly arrivedat and evenly applied. Information maintained by institutional fiduciaries should not be volunteered unless necessary to forestall an ongoing or imminent serious wrong.
Scientific novelty the article suggests the following recommendations on the access of law enforcement bodies to data bases a if a policing agency seeks nonpublic records about an identified person it should have to demonstrate suspicion of wrongdoing proportionate to the intrusion involved b if a law enforcement agency is accessing data for the purpose of executing a profile to identify suspects it should ensure the profile produces the requisite proportionality derived hit rate avoids illegitimate discrimination and uses an understandable algorithm c if policing agencies are relying on a crime rather than a suspect or a profile as the starting point of the investigation the crime should be serious and the number of people investigated kept to the minimum dictated by the time and place of the crime d collections of data needed by law enforcement should be maintained outside of government to the extent consistent with governing needs but wherever maintained they should be authorized by specific legislation and administrative rules transparently and democratically arrived at.
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Practical significance the main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used in scientific and educational activities while consideration the issues related to identification suppression and prevention of crimes. |
topic |
Policing |
url |
http://apel.ieml.ru/storage/archive_articles/9901.pdf |
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