Causation and the Agent’s Point of View
<p>There are philosophers who deny that causal relations actually exist in nature, arguing that they are merely a product of our perspective as beings capable of intentional actions. In this paper I briefly explain this thesis and consider that it needs to be complemented with a basic non-caus...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of the Basque Country
2014-02-01
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| Series: | THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science |
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| Online Access: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/6952 |
| Summary: | <p>There are philosophers who deny that causal relations actually exist in nature, arguing that they are merely a product of our perspective as beings capable of intentional actions. In this paper I briefly explain this thesis and consider that it needs to be complemented with a basic non-causal ontological perspective which can account for phenomena taken as causal; I then describe what seems to be a good candidate for such an ontology and finally conclude, however, that it cannot dispense with the concept of causation and that therefore is not the kind of ontology that anti-realism about causal relations requires.</p> |
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| ISSN: | 0495-4548 2171-679X |