Scientific Pluralism and Inconsistency Toleration
In this paper I examine the problem of inconsistency toleration in the context of scientific pluralism. I argue that, first of all, the notion of inconsistency toleration has to be qualified with respect to the evaluative attitude that one takes towards a given scientific theory or theories. Second...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente
2018-05-01
|
| Series: | Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/31 |
| Summary: | In this paper I examine the problem of inconsistency toleration in the context of scientific pluralism. I argue that, first of all, the notion of inconsistency toleration has to be qualified with respect to the evaluative attitude that one takes towards a given scientific theory or theories. Second, I show which types of inconsistency toleration are compatible with two major approaches to scientific pluralism, the so-called modest and the radical one. In view of this I suggest some points of demarcation between these two approaches.
|
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1972-1293 |