Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services

The paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain. Considering different information structure, a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous actions on investment and price is first formulate...

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Main Authors: Jian Liu, Yinzhen Li, Jun Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi Limited 2015-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/680685
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spelling doaj-2ed86d56f8bd416c84ce8e2312e6af1e2020-11-24T23:09:04ZengHindawi LimitedDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2015-01-01201510.1155/2015/680685680685Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport ServicesJian Liu0Yinzhen Li1Jun Li2School of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, ChinaSchool of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, ChinaThe paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain. Considering different information structure, a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous actions on investment and price is first formulated. Equilibria show both parties have motivation to select coopetition even if the agreement for cooperation investment is reached in advance. When both firms agree on the specific allocation, the new coopetition with higher efficiency would be emerged. Moreover, we analyze the complexity and evolution of coopetition by repeated pricing game with finitely and infinitely time horizon. In the finitely repeated pricing game, both firms have incentive to reach a tacit understanding to alternate choosing price cooperation and competition after setting suitable allocation scheme; the repeated periods t are then going to be an issue. In the infinitely repeated pricing game, the perfect cooperation is realized by designing the suitable trigger strategy.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/680685
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Jian Liu
Yinzhen Li
Jun Li
spellingShingle Jian Liu
Yinzhen Li
Jun Li
Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
author_facet Jian Liu
Yinzhen Li
Jun Li
author_sort Jian Liu
title Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services
title_short Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services
title_full Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services
title_fullStr Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services
title_full_unstemmed Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services
title_sort coopetition in intermodal freight transport services
publisher Hindawi Limited
series Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
issn 1026-0226
1607-887X
publishDate 2015-01-01
description The paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain. Considering different information structure, a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous actions on investment and price is first formulated. Equilibria show both parties have motivation to select coopetition even if the agreement for cooperation investment is reached in advance. When both firms agree on the specific allocation, the new coopetition with higher efficiency would be emerged. Moreover, we analyze the complexity and evolution of coopetition by repeated pricing game with finitely and infinitely time horizon. In the finitely repeated pricing game, both firms have incentive to reach a tacit understanding to alternate choosing price cooperation and competition after setting suitable allocation scheme; the repeated periods t are then going to be an issue. In the infinitely repeated pricing game, the perfect cooperation is realized by designing the suitable trigger strategy.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/680685
work_keys_str_mv AT jianliu coopetitioninintermodalfreighttransportservices
AT yinzhenli coopetitioninintermodalfreighttransportservices
AT junli coopetitioninintermodalfreighttransportservices
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