Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services
The paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain. Considering different information structure, a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous actions on investment and price is first formulate...
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Hindawi Limited
2015-01-01
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Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/680685 |
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doaj-2ed86d56f8bd416c84ce8e2312e6af1e2020-11-24T23:09:04ZengHindawi LimitedDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2015-01-01201510.1155/2015/680685680685Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport ServicesJian Liu0Yinzhen Li1Jun Li2School of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, ChinaSchool of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, ChinaThe paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain. Considering different information structure, a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous actions on investment and price is first formulated. Equilibria show both parties have motivation to select coopetition even if the agreement for cooperation investment is reached in advance. When both firms agree on the specific allocation, the new coopetition with higher efficiency would be emerged. Moreover, we analyze the complexity and evolution of coopetition by repeated pricing game with finitely and infinitely time horizon. In the finitely repeated pricing game, both firms have incentive to reach a tacit understanding to alternate choosing price cooperation and competition after setting suitable allocation scheme; the repeated periods t are then going to be an issue. In the infinitely repeated pricing game, the perfect cooperation is realized by designing the suitable trigger strategy.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/680685 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Jian Liu Yinzhen Li Jun Li |
spellingShingle |
Jian Liu Yinzhen Li Jun Li Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
author_facet |
Jian Liu Yinzhen Li Jun Li |
author_sort |
Jian Liu |
title |
Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services |
title_short |
Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services |
title_full |
Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services |
title_fullStr |
Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services |
title_full_unstemmed |
Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services |
title_sort |
coopetition in intermodal freight transport services |
publisher |
Hindawi Limited |
series |
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
issn |
1026-0226 1607-887X |
publishDate |
2015-01-01 |
description |
The paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain. Considering different information structure, a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous actions on investment and price is first formulated. Equilibria show both parties have motivation to select coopetition even if the agreement for cooperation investment is reached in advance. When both firms agree on the specific allocation, the new coopetition with higher efficiency would be emerged. Moreover, we analyze the complexity and evolution of coopetition by repeated pricing game with finitely and infinitely time horizon. In the finitely repeated pricing game, both firms have incentive to reach a tacit understanding to alternate choosing price cooperation and competition after setting suitable allocation scheme; the repeated periods t are then going to be an issue. In the infinitely repeated pricing game, the perfect cooperation is realized by designing the suitable trigger strategy. |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/680685 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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