Three Potential Problems for Powers' One-Fallacy Theory
Lawrence Powers advocates a one-fallacy theory in which the only real fallacies are fallacies of ambiguity. He defines a fallacy, in general, as a bad argument that appears good. He claims that the only legitimate way that an argument can appear valid, while being invalid, is when the invalid infere...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Windsor
2003-01-01
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| Series: | Informal Logic |
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| Online Access: | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/2175 |
| Summary: | Lawrence Powers advocates a one-fallacy theory in which the only real fallacies are fallacies of ambiguity. He defines a fallacy, in general, as a bad argument that appears good. He claims that the only legitimate way that an argument can appear valid, while being invalid, is when the invalid inference is covered by an ambiguity. Several different kinds of counterexamples have been offered from begging the question, to various forms of ad hominem fallacies. In this paper, I outline three potential counterexamples to Powers' theory, including one that has been addressed already by Powers, and two which are well known problems, but until now have never been applied as counterexamples to Powers' theory. I argue that there is a simpler explanation of these 'hard' cases than positing ambiguities that are not obviously there. |
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| ISSN: | 0824-2577 2293-734X |