Approaching the other: Investigation of a descriptive belief revision model

When an individual—a hearer—is confronted with an opinion expressed by another individual—a speaker—differing from her only in terms of a degree of belief, how will she react? In trying to answer that question this paper reintroduces and investigates a descriptive belief revision model designed to m...

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Main Author: Spyridon Stelios
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Taylor & Francis Group 2016-12-01
Series:Cogent Psychology
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2016.1164931
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spelling doaj-2d039c23d7ae4d6b801738ce93f573f42021-03-18T16:21:44ZengTaylor & Francis GroupCogent Psychology2331-19082016-12-013110.1080/23311908.2016.11649311164931Approaching the other: Investigation of a descriptive belief revision modelSpyridon Stelios0School of Applied Mathematical and Physical Sciences, National Technical University of AthensWhen an individual—a hearer—is confronted with an opinion expressed by another individual—a speaker—differing from her only in terms of a degree of belief, how will she react? In trying to answer that question this paper reintroduces and investigates a descriptive belief revision model designed to measure approaches. Parameters of the model are the hearer’s credibility account of the speaker, the initial difference between the hearer’s and speaker’s degrees of belief, and the hearer’s resistance to change. Within an interdisciplinary framework, two empirical studies were conducted. A comparison was carried out between empirically recorded revisions and revisions according to the model. Results showed that the theoretical model is highly confirmed. An interesting finding is the measurement of an “unexplainable behaviour” that is not classified either as repulsion or as approach. At a second level of analysis, the model is compared to the Bayesian framework of inference. Structural differences and evidence for optimal descriptive adequacy of the former were highlighted.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2016.1164931cognitive sciencebelief revisionepistemologyexperimental philosophy
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Spyridon Stelios
spellingShingle Spyridon Stelios
Approaching the other: Investigation of a descriptive belief revision model
Cogent Psychology
cognitive science
belief revision
epistemology
experimental philosophy
author_facet Spyridon Stelios
author_sort Spyridon Stelios
title Approaching the other: Investigation of a descriptive belief revision model
title_short Approaching the other: Investigation of a descriptive belief revision model
title_full Approaching the other: Investigation of a descriptive belief revision model
title_fullStr Approaching the other: Investigation of a descriptive belief revision model
title_full_unstemmed Approaching the other: Investigation of a descriptive belief revision model
title_sort approaching the other: investigation of a descriptive belief revision model
publisher Taylor & Francis Group
series Cogent Psychology
issn 2331-1908
publishDate 2016-12-01
description When an individual—a hearer—is confronted with an opinion expressed by another individual—a speaker—differing from her only in terms of a degree of belief, how will she react? In trying to answer that question this paper reintroduces and investigates a descriptive belief revision model designed to measure approaches. Parameters of the model are the hearer’s credibility account of the speaker, the initial difference between the hearer’s and speaker’s degrees of belief, and the hearer’s resistance to change. Within an interdisciplinary framework, two empirical studies were conducted. A comparison was carried out between empirically recorded revisions and revisions according to the model. Results showed that the theoretical model is highly confirmed. An interesting finding is the measurement of an “unexplainable behaviour” that is not classified either as repulsion or as approach. At a second level of analysis, the model is compared to the Bayesian framework of inference. Structural differences and evidence for optimal descriptive adequacy of the former were highlighted.
topic cognitive science
belief revision
epistemology
experimental philosophy
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2016.1164931
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