The 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: When, why, and how?

The paper provides a critical assessment of a new approach to consumer credit regulation called the 'new' paternalism, the aim of which is to protect consumers from various biases identified within behavioral economics, while at the same time preserving the consumer's freedom of choic...

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Main Author: Odorović Ana
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, Belgrade, Serbia 2018-01-01
Series:Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu
Subjects:
Online Access:https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0003-2565/2018/0003-25651804156O.pdf
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spelling doaj-2c92a20183f9445daaa2316b48f2a5ae2021-03-22T10:59:21ZengUniversity of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, Belgrade, SerbiaAnali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu0003-25652406-26932018-01-0166415617610.5937/AnaliPFB1804156O0003-25651804156OThe 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: When, why, and how?Odorović Ana0University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, SerbiaThe paper provides a critical assessment of a new approach to consumer credit regulation called the 'new' paternalism, the aim of which is to protect consumers from various biases identified within behavioral economics, while at the same time preserving the consumer's freedom of choice. Consumer credit contracts, in particular credit cards, have evolved into an ever-growing complexity of contract terms, with a tendency to accelerate the short-term benefits and postpone the long-term costs for consumers arising out of the contract. Since both rational-choice and behavioral economics theory provide a rationale for such a contractual design, the first part of the paper confronts their predictions to argue that they are to some extent complementary and that a consumer credit regulation should not strictly align with one or the other, but rather reconcile them. The paper then discusses in more detail the features and tools of the regulatory approach of the 'new' paternalism, applicable more broadly to consumer protection and encompassing three closely related ideas of libertarian, asymmetrical and weak paternalism. It also compares the theoretical foundations of the 'new' paternalism to the 'old' paternalism, on the one hand, which implies protecting consumers by effectively making choices instead of them, and 'laissez-faire' approach, on the other hand, which entirely neglects consumers' behavioral biases. Finally, the paper addresses the issue of which regulatory tools of the new paternalism are pertinent to the credit card market, and further considers their expected effectiveness and limitations.https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0003-2565/2018/0003-25651804156O.pdfbehavioral paternalismconsumer creditcredit cardscontract efficiencybehavioral law and economics
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Odorović Ana
spellingShingle Odorović Ana
The 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: When, why, and how?
Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu
behavioral paternalism
consumer credit
credit cards
contract efficiency
behavioral law and economics
author_facet Odorović Ana
author_sort Odorović Ana
title The 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: When, why, and how?
title_short The 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: When, why, and how?
title_full The 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: When, why, and how?
title_fullStr The 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: When, why, and how?
title_full_unstemmed The 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: When, why, and how?
title_sort 'new' paternalism in consumer credit regulation: when, why, and how?
publisher University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, Belgrade, Serbia
series Anali Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu
issn 0003-2565
2406-2693
publishDate 2018-01-01
description The paper provides a critical assessment of a new approach to consumer credit regulation called the 'new' paternalism, the aim of which is to protect consumers from various biases identified within behavioral economics, while at the same time preserving the consumer's freedom of choice. Consumer credit contracts, in particular credit cards, have evolved into an ever-growing complexity of contract terms, with a tendency to accelerate the short-term benefits and postpone the long-term costs for consumers arising out of the contract. Since both rational-choice and behavioral economics theory provide a rationale for such a contractual design, the first part of the paper confronts their predictions to argue that they are to some extent complementary and that a consumer credit regulation should not strictly align with one or the other, but rather reconcile them. The paper then discusses in more detail the features and tools of the regulatory approach of the 'new' paternalism, applicable more broadly to consumer protection and encompassing three closely related ideas of libertarian, asymmetrical and weak paternalism. It also compares the theoretical foundations of the 'new' paternalism to the 'old' paternalism, on the one hand, which implies protecting consumers by effectively making choices instead of them, and 'laissez-faire' approach, on the other hand, which entirely neglects consumers' behavioral biases. Finally, the paper addresses the issue of which regulatory tools of the new paternalism are pertinent to the credit card market, and further considers their expected effectiveness and limitations.
topic behavioral paternalism
consumer credit
credit cards
contract efficiency
behavioral law and economics
url https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0003-2565/2018/0003-25651804156O.pdf
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