Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses
We model a game between two players taking biosecurity actions and characterize the Nash equilibria and their properties for the cases of strategic complements and substitutes. Implications of the theoretical model are investigated using data for biosecurity behavior among producers participating in...
Main Authors: | Mimako Kobayashi, Tigran A. Melkonyan |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Western Agricultural Economics Association
2011-08-01
|
Series: | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/117152 |
Similar Items
-
Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
by: Hoffmann, E.J, et al.
Published: (2019) -
Potential for import substitution of livestock products in the Republic of Kazakhstan
by: O. K. Denissova, et al.
Published: (2021-03-01) -
Arizona Seasonal Passes for Exhibition Livestock
by: Colville, Cheyanne M., et al.
Published: (2016) -
Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Motivation and Domestic Employment by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)
by: Hong, E., et al.
Published: (2019) -
REGULARITIES AND TRENDS OF THE OF THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY CURRENT STATE IN THE ZHYTOMYR REGION
by: V. Mykytyuk
Published: (2020-12-01)