| Summary: | The strategy method is
a powerful method for eliciting conditional cooperation in strategic
interactions. Theoretically, players' cooperation conditional on a specific
level of others’ cooperation using the strategy method should be equal to their
unconditional cooperation given an equivalent belief about others’ cooperation.
However, using the Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that decisions using the
strategy method are more selfish than decisions under a simultaneous decision
protocol predicted from players’ beliefs. This is driven entirely by lower
cooperation among conditional cooperators with low expectations about others’
cooperation. We further show that relative to simultaneous choice, the strategy
method shifts salient norms from an egalitarian fairness norm (`give half’) to
a reciprocity norm (`match others’ behaviour'). This undermines cooperation
among players with low beliefs about others’ cooperation. These results thus
show that the strategy method does not merely hold beliefs constant, but also
shifts which salient norms influence choice behaviour. This has important
implications for the use of the strategy method in eliciting social
preferences. Keywords: cooperation, Prisoner’s Dilemma, social norms, social
preferences, strategy method
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