Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly

In this paper, we consider the relative efficiency of unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in terms of welfare implications in different imperfectly competitive markets. Under the assumption that these two taxations can produce the same total output in equilibrium, which is also used by Anderson ()...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Aiyuan Tao, Yingjun Zhu, Xiangqing Zou
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Taylor & Francis Group 2019-01-01
Series:Ekonomska Istraživanja
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2018.1555048
id doaj-26c6d9ae7951404a8fd2c51fc17c5dc6
record_format Article
spelling doaj-26c6d9ae7951404a8fd2c51fc17c5dc62020-11-25T02:07:43ZengTaylor & Francis GroupEkonomska Istraživanja1331-677X1848-96642019-01-0132147349110.1080/1331677X.2018.15550481555048Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopolyAiyuan Tao0Yingjun Zhu1Xiangqing Zou2Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and FinanceShanghai Lixin University of Accounting and FinanceShanghai Lixin University of Accounting and FinanceIn this paper, we consider the relative efficiency of unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in terms of welfare implications in different imperfectly competitive markets. Under the assumption that these two taxations can produce the same total output in equilibrium, which is also used by Anderson (), we show that ad valorem taxation is always welfare superior to unit taxation under full nationalisation, full privatisation, and partial privatisation.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2018.1555048unit taxationad valorem taxationefficiencypartial privatisation
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Aiyuan Tao
Yingjun Zhu
Xiangqing Zou
spellingShingle Aiyuan Tao
Yingjun Zhu
Xiangqing Zou
Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly
Ekonomska Istraživanja
unit taxation
ad valorem taxation
efficiency
partial privatisation
author_facet Aiyuan Tao
Yingjun Zhu
Xiangqing Zou
author_sort Aiyuan Tao
title Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly
title_short Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly
title_full Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly
title_fullStr Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly
title_full_unstemmed Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly
title_sort efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly
publisher Taylor & Francis Group
series Ekonomska Istraživanja
issn 1331-677X
1848-9664
publishDate 2019-01-01
description In this paper, we consider the relative efficiency of unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in terms of welfare implications in different imperfectly competitive markets. Under the assumption that these two taxations can produce the same total output in equilibrium, which is also used by Anderson (), we show that ad valorem taxation is always welfare superior to unit taxation under full nationalisation, full privatisation, and partial privatisation.
topic unit taxation
ad valorem taxation
efficiency
partial privatisation
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2018.1555048
work_keys_str_mv AT aiyuantao efficiencycomparisonofunitandadvaloremtaxationinmixedduopoly
AT yingjunzhu efficiencycomparisonofunitandadvaloremtaxationinmixedduopoly
AT xiangqingzou efficiencycomparisonofunitandadvaloremtaxationinmixedduopoly
_version_ 1724930032175939584