Efficiency comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation in mixed duopoly
In this paper, we consider the relative efficiency of unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in terms of welfare implications in different imperfectly competitive markets. Under the assumption that these two taxations can produce the same total output in equilibrium, which is also used by Anderson ()...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Taylor & Francis Group
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Ekonomska Istraživanja |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2018.1555048 |
| Summary: | In this paper, we consider the relative efficiency of unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in terms of welfare implications in different imperfectly competitive markets. Under the assumption that these two taxations can produce the same total output in equilibrium, which is also used by Anderson (), we show that ad valorem taxation is always welfare superior to unit taxation under full nationalisation, full privatisation, and partial privatisation. |
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| ISSN: | 1331-677X 1848-9664 |