Four factors are in force pandemic joints to initiate an illicit dual use technologies transfer from Ukraine

• Main Author: Iegor Kartuzov
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: PC Technology Center 2021-06-01
• Series: ScienceRise
• Subjects: export control; covid pandemic; dual use technology; illicit technology transfer
• Online Access: http://journal.eu-jr.eu/sciencerise/article/view/1926
• ISSN: 2313-6286; 2313-8416

An objective of this effort is a quick recap to assess the underpin barriers of transfer of technologies appeared in Ukraine after acquiring the Independence and those developed of today and to highlight and evaluate an impact of political, historical, mental and other factors affecting the science and as a consequence leakage of technologies abroad. Of importance is also a question if a current COVID-19 pandemic will join these factors if it initiates an illicit transfer of dual use (DU) technologies from Ukraine as it was in 1990s and how it affects an efficient and proper functioning and optimization of transfer of technologies process, and that is quite a challenge nowadays. Investigated problem. The process of technology transfer and specifically that one of DU as a whole is neither simple nor systematic and far from being that perfect, especially when it deals with dual-use technologies and at present reduced to a short relationship between supplier/recipient only. The experience and practice show that it is a rather complicated, multi-leveled and multi-players process which is impacted and follows several factors and conditions that determine its success and/or failure at the end. The main scientific results. The development of dual use technologies continues in a quagmire of conflicting interests and technology transfer export control rationales. There are historical, mental and political-military considerations where a state’s decision to develop weapon systems or related applications can be assessed not only as a function of perceived levels of threat to its security, but also as a need to respond and/or step forward to potential technological innovations; and second, the fundamental conceptual differences in appreciation among countries of the right to possess different advanced weapons systems for defensive or offensive purposes. The result of this endeavor makes a solid ground floor for further debates in terms of political science, export control regulations and factors affecting transfer of sensitive technologies.