Political Budget Cycles in the European Union

• Main Author: Jiří Gregor
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Mendel University Press 2016-01-01
• Series: Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis
• Subjects: political budget cycles; government expenditures; government revenues; elections; GDP growth; dynamic panel model
• Online Access: https://acta.mendelu.cz/64/2/0595/
• ISSN: 1211-8516; 2464-8310

This paper provides research on the theme of the political budget cycles. The goal is to find out whether or not the government tries to manipulate the state budget and its components for the purpose of re-election across the countries of the European Union. In order to verify this theory a dynamic panel data model was used. The results were significant, but only if predetermined elections were not counted into the estimations. In that case, the theory of the political budget cycles could be accepted as valid for the EU countries. The main driving force of the political budget cycles across the countries of the European Union is fluctuation of the government expenditures. During the election year, the government expenditures are higher, and a year after the election, government expenditures are lower. This is reflected into the state budget balance.