On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth

We defend the claim that the inferential conception of representation is generally deflationary; and we show that deflationism is consistent with pluralism regarding the notion of cognitive representation. The nature and extent of this pluralism is explored by means of an analogy with the minimalist...

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Main Authors: Mauricio SUÁREZ, Albert SOLÉ
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of the Basque Country 2010-01-01
Series:THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science
Online Access:http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/552
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spelling doaj-241e06a967e94752bae6165354bebd332020-11-24T23:22:38ZengUniversity of the Basque CountryTHEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science0495-45482171-679X2010-01-01211394810.1387/theoria.552549On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and TruthMauricio SUÁREZAlbert SOLÉWe defend the claim that the inferential conception of representation is generally deflationary; and we show that deflationism is consistent with pluralism regarding the notion of cognitive representation. The nature and extent of this pluralism is explored by means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth.http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/552
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Mauricio SUÁREZ
Albert SOLÉ
spellingShingle Mauricio SUÁREZ
Albert SOLÉ
On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science
author_facet Mauricio SUÁREZ
Albert SOLÉ
author_sort Mauricio SUÁREZ
title On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
title_short On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
title_full On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
title_fullStr On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
title_full_unstemmed On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
title_sort on the analogy between cognitive representation and truth
publisher University of the Basque Country
series THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science
issn 0495-4548
2171-679X
publishDate 2010-01-01
description We defend the claim that the inferential conception of representation is generally deflationary; and we show that deflationism is consistent with pluralism regarding the notion of cognitive representation. The nature and extent of this pluralism is explored by means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth.
url http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/552
work_keys_str_mv AT mauriciosuarez ontheanalogybetweencognitiverepresentationandtruth
AT albertsole ontheanalogybetweencognitiverepresentationandtruth
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