Sweden and Coronavirus: Unexceptional Exceptionalism

The aims of this article are, first, to describe the Swedish authorities’ strategy for dealing with the sudden onset of novel coronavirus in early 2020 and, second, to explain why that strategy differed markedly from those in nearly all other European countries. From an early stage, the Swedish gove...

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Main Authors: Staffan Andersson, Nicholas Aylott
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-12-01
Series:Social Sciences
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/9/12/232
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spelling doaj-238ad380abad4a6a9847f69753cf87fc2020-12-16T00:05:33ZengMDPI AGSocial Sciences2076-07602020-12-01923223210.3390/socsci9120232Sweden and Coronavirus: Unexceptional ExceptionalismStaffan Andersson0Nicholas Aylott1Department of Political Science, Linnaeus University, SE-351 95 Växjö, SwedenSchool of Social Sciences, Södertörn University, SE-141 89 Stockholm, SwedenThe aims of this article are, first, to describe the Swedish authorities’ strategy for dealing with the sudden onset of novel coronavirus in early 2020 and, second, to explain why that strategy differed markedly from those in nearly all other European countries. From an early stage, the Swedish government delegated decision making to the Public Health Agency, and its goal was to mitigate the effects of the virus rather than to suppress its spread. Society was never closed down in the same way as elsewhere. Using data from media reports and other publications, we argue that the agency was insulated from pressure to change course, even as the number of deaths associated with covid-19 rose far above those in Sweden’s Nordic neighbours, by four conditions: (1) the structure of national public administration; (2) an outburst of nationalism in parts of the media; (3) the uneven impact of the virus; and (4) a political leadership that was willing to delegate responsibility for policy almost entirely. We conclude by briefly comparing the coronavirus strategy to previous episodes of Swedish policy exceptionalism. This emerging pattern, we suggest, raises normative questions about the functioning of Swedish democracy.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/9/12/232Swedencoronavirusstrategymitigationmediapublic administration
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Staffan Andersson
Nicholas Aylott
spellingShingle Staffan Andersson
Nicholas Aylott
Sweden and Coronavirus: Unexceptional Exceptionalism
Social Sciences
Sweden
coronavirus
strategy
mitigation
media
public administration
author_facet Staffan Andersson
Nicholas Aylott
author_sort Staffan Andersson
title Sweden and Coronavirus: Unexceptional Exceptionalism
title_short Sweden and Coronavirus: Unexceptional Exceptionalism
title_full Sweden and Coronavirus: Unexceptional Exceptionalism
title_fullStr Sweden and Coronavirus: Unexceptional Exceptionalism
title_full_unstemmed Sweden and Coronavirus: Unexceptional Exceptionalism
title_sort sweden and coronavirus: unexceptional exceptionalism
publisher MDPI AG
series Social Sciences
issn 2076-0760
publishDate 2020-12-01
description The aims of this article are, first, to describe the Swedish authorities’ strategy for dealing with the sudden onset of novel coronavirus in early 2020 and, second, to explain why that strategy differed markedly from those in nearly all other European countries. From an early stage, the Swedish government delegated decision making to the Public Health Agency, and its goal was to mitigate the effects of the virus rather than to suppress its spread. Society was never closed down in the same way as elsewhere. Using data from media reports and other publications, we argue that the agency was insulated from pressure to change course, even as the number of deaths associated with covid-19 rose far above those in Sweden’s Nordic neighbours, by four conditions: (1) the structure of national public administration; (2) an outburst of nationalism in parts of the media; (3) the uneven impact of the virus; and (4) a political leadership that was willing to delegate responsibility for policy almost entirely. We conclude by briefly comparing the coronavirus strategy to previous episodes of Swedish policy exceptionalism. This emerging pattern, we suggest, raises normative questions about the functioning of Swedish democracy.
topic Sweden
coronavirus
strategy
mitigation
media
public administration
url https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/9/12/232
work_keys_str_mv AT staffanandersson swedenandcoronavirusunexceptionalexceptionalism
AT nicholasaylott swedenandcoronavirusunexceptionalexceptionalism
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