On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral Philosophy
The paper discusses the two meanings that ‘method’ is often assumed to have in moral philosophy: the epistemic meaning, according to which a method is a procedure to reach moral knowledge, and the normative meaning, according to which it is a criterion of right and wrong in actions. The origin of t...
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Firenze University Press
2019-03-01
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| Series: | Phenomenology and Mind |
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| Online Access: | https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7323 |
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doaj-237baa38ed0240b8a50389343f457e092020-11-25T03:18:23ZengFirenze University PressPhenomenology and Mind2280-78532239-40282019-03-011510.13128/Phe_Mi-24972On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral PhilosophyMassimo Reichlin0Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele The paper discusses the two meanings that ‘method’ is often assumed to have in moral philosophy: the epistemic meaning, according to which a method is a procedure to reach moral knowledge, and the normative meaning, according to which it is a criterion of right and wrong in actions. The origin of these two, clearly connected meanings can be traced to Sidgwick’s work The Methods of Ethics. It is argued that Sidgwick’s seminal idea of a “reflective equilibrium” is a valuable and lasting contribution to the debate on moral epistemology; however, Sidgwick’s characterisation of the different normative options is biased against non consequentialist approaches by its concentration on “methods”, rather than on theories and “ultimate reasons”. This consequentialist bias still lingers in contemporary ethics. https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7323methodSidgwickreflective equilibrium consequentialism |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Massimo Reichlin |
| spellingShingle |
Massimo Reichlin On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral Philosophy Phenomenology and Mind method Sidgwick reflective equilibrium consequentialism |
| author_facet |
Massimo Reichlin |
| author_sort |
Massimo Reichlin |
| title |
On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral Philosophy |
| title_short |
On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral Philosophy |
| title_full |
On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral Philosophy |
| title_fullStr |
On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral Philosophy |
| title_full_unstemmed |
On the Idea of a ‘Method’ in Moral Philosophy |
| title_sort |
on the idea of a ‘method’ in moral philosophy |
| publisher |
Firenze University Press |
| series |
Phenomenology and Mind |
| issn |
2280-7853 2239-4028 |
| publishDate |
2019-03-01 |
| description |
The paper discusses the two meanings that ‘method’ is often assumed to have in moral philosophy: the epistemic meaning, according to which a method is a procedure to reach moral knowledge, and the normative meaning, according to which it is a criterion of right and wrong in actions. The origin of these two, clearly connected meanings can be traced to Sidgwick’s work The Methods of Ethics. It is argued that Sidgwick’s seminal idea of a “reflective equilibrium” is a valuable and lasting contribution to the debate on moral epistemology; however, Sidgwick’s characterisation of the different normative options is biased against non consequentialist approaches by its concentration on “methods”, rather than on theories and “ultimate reasons”. This consequentialist bias still lingers in contemporary ethics.
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| topic |
method Sidgwick reflective equilibrium consequentialism |
| url |
https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7323 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT massimoreichlin ontheideaofamethodinmoralphilosophy |
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