Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emis...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Linming Qi, Lu Liu, Liwen Jiang, Zicheng Wang, Weiliang Zhao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi Limited 2020-01-01
Series:Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9515710
id doaj-2355fc2b0b434c94ab7460848e0f2b43
record_format Article
spelling doaj-2355fc2b0b434c94ab7460848e0f2b432020-11-25T02:02:24ZengHindawi LimitedMathematical Problems in Engineering1024-123X1563-51472020-01-01202010.1155/2020/95157109515710Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk AversionLinming Qi0Lu Liu1Liwen Jiang2Zicheng Wang3Weiliang Zhao4Department of Fundamental Courses, Zhejiang Industry Polytechnic College, Shaoxing, Zhejiang 312000, ChinaCollege of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, Shandong 266590, ChinaCollege of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, Shandong 266590, ChinaCollege of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, Shandong 266590, ChinaDepartment of Fundamental Courses, Zhejiang Industry Polytechnic College, Shaoxing, Zhejiang 312000, ChinaMany small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9515710
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Linming Qi
Lu Liu
Liwen Jiang
Zicheng Wang
Weiliang Zhao
spellingShingle Linming Qi
Lu Liu
Liwen Jiang
Zicheng Wang
Weiliang Zhao
Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
author_facet Linming Qi
Lu Liu
Liwen Jiang
Zicheng Wang
Weiliang Zhao
author_sort Linming Qi
title Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion
title_short Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion
title_full Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion
title_fullStr Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion
title_sort optimal operation strategies under a carbon cap-and-trade mechanism: a capital-constrained supply chain incorporating risk aversion
publisher Hindawi Limited
series Mathematical Problems in Engineering
issn 1024-123X
1563-5147
publishDate 2020-01-01
description Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9515710
work_keys_str_mv AT linmingqi optimaloperationstrategiesunderacarboncapandtrademechanismacapitalconstrainedsupplychainincorporatingriskaversion
AT luliu optimaloperationstrategiesunderacarboncapandtrademechanismacapitalconstrainedsupplychainincorporatingriskaversion
AT liwenjiang optimaloperationstrategiesunderacarboncapandtrademechanismacapitalconstrainedsupplychainincorporatingriskaversion
AT zichengwang optimaloperationstrategiesunderacarboncapandtrademechanismacapitalconstrainedsupplychainincorporatingriskaversion
AT weiliangzhao optimaloperationstrategiesunderacarboncapandtrademechanismacapitalconstrainedsupplychainincorporatingriskaversion
_version_ 1715593250003222528