First Person and Body Ownership
Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad de La Serena
2019-11-01
|
| Series: | Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Literatura y Filosofía |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.userena.cl/index.php/logos/article/view/1202 |
| Summary: | Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications.
|
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 0716-7520 0719-3262 |