PRINCIPAL-AGENT PREFERENCES IN IMPERFECT MARKET: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON MURABAHAH AND IJARAH

PRINCIPAL-AGENT PREFERENCES IN IMPERFECT MARKET: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON MURABAHAH AND IJARAH

This paper aims to determine the optimal contract for the principal and the agent in imperfect market, when murabahah and ijarah are used. The financial contracting enforceability approach is employed to determine the contract that maximizes the value of the firm subject to agents’ constraints when...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hechem Ajmi, Hassanuddeen Abdul Aziz, Salina Kassim, Walid Mansour
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Bank Indonesia 2019-05-01
Series:Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance
Subjects:
murabahah,
ijarah,
conflict of interest
monte-carlo simulation
market frictions
optimal contract
Online Access:http://jimf-bi.org/index.php/JIMF/article/view/1050

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