Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium in the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may result in a bubble or...
Main Authors: | Jinpeng Ma, Qiongling Li |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
2016-12-01
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Series: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: |
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v001-1/p_01.pdf
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