R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusion
The purpose of this study is to compare the consequences of, first, quantity leadership, and, second, price leadership competition of duopolists for their R&D investments, within the situation of a cartelized industry. Using game-theoretical approach and numerical analysis, it turns out that...
Main Authors: | Adam Karbowski, Jacek Prokop |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Faculty of Economics University of Rijeka
2018-12-01
|
Series: | Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.efri.uniri.hr/upload/02-Karbowski-Prokop-2018-2.pdf |
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