Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world

In this paper, I identify two key contributions that David Ingram makes to the migration ethics literature, one methodological and one substantive. Ingram’s methodological contribution is to model how non-ideal theorizing can be done without abstracting away the complexities surrounding migration, i...

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Main Author: Drew Thompson
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Taylor & Francis Group 2019-11-01
Series:Ethics & Global Politics
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1693871
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spelling doaj-1ee2bf4973bc4e1ca7faf6e3cc90fbc62020-11-25T01:41:09ZengTaylor & Francis GroupEthics & Global Politics1654-49511654-63692019-11-01124213110.1080/16544951.2019.16938711693871Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal worldDrew Thompson0Loyola University ChicagoIn this paper, I identify two key contributions that David Ingram makes to the migration ethics literature, one methodological and one substantive. Ingram’s methodological contribution is to model how non-ideal theorizing can be done without abstracting away the complexities surrounding migration, including how the motivation to migrate is tied to existing institutional structures. He does this by beginning with the powerlessness and coercion experienced by certain classes of migrants, which he analyses using a rich conception of agency as social freedom. From here, Ingram develops his substantive contribution. Ingram argues that cosmopolitan and communitarian analyses cannot fully capture the dilemma surrounding forced migration: migrate to improve welfare or remain for the sake of identity and community. Ingram identifies the injustice of borders as occurring within the context of an interconnected international order operating without discursive accountability to most of those affected by its policies. Ingram argues that until international institutions are suitably reformed, asylum is owed to economic refugees because of the coercive circumstances existing in their countries of origin. This allows him to show, too, why specific states have obligations to asylum seekers: because they participate in the institutions that have contributed to these circumstances. Although I agree with Ingram’s overall approach, I will question whether he downplays the demands of his conception of social freedom and consider the feasibility of institutionalizing his discourse theoretic framework.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1693871immigrationdiscourse ethicsasylumhuman rightsglobal justice
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Drew Thompson
spellingShingle Drew Thompson
Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world
Ethics & Global Politics
immigration
discourse ethics
asylum
human rights
global justice
author_facet Drew Thompson
author_sort Drew Thompson
title Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world
title_short Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world
title_full Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world
title_fullStr Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world
title_full_unstemmed Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world
title_sort social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world
publisher Taylor & Francis Group
series Ethics & Global Politics
issn 1654-4951
1654-6369
publishDate 2019-11-01
description In this paper, I identify two key contributions that David Ingram makes to the migration ethics literature, one methodological and one substantive. Ingram’s methodological contribution is to model how non-ideal theorizing can be done without abstracting away the complexities surrounding migration, including how the motivation to migrate is tied to existing institutional structures. He does this by beginning with the powerlessness and coercion experienced by certain classes of migrants, which he analyses using a rich conception of agency as social freedom. From here, Ingram develops his substantive contribution. Ingram argues that cosmopolitan and communitarian analyses cannot fully capture the dilemma surrounding forced migration: migrate to improve welfare or remain for the sake of identity and community. Ingram identifies the injustice of borders as occurring within the context of an interconnected international order operating without discursive accountability to most of those affected by its policies. Ingram argues that until international institutions are suitably reformed, asylum is owed to economic refugees because of the coercive circumstances existing in their countries of origin. This allows him to show, too, why specific states have obligations to asylum seekers: because they participate in the institutions that have contributed to these circumstances. Although I agree with Ingram’s overall approach, I will question whether he downplays the demands of his conception of social freedom and consider the feasibility of institutionalizing his discourse theoretic framework.
topic immigration
discourse ethics
asylum
human rights
global justice
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1693871
work_keys_str_mv AT drewthompson socialfreedomandmigrationinanonidealworld
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