Liberal Neutrality : Constructivist, not foundationalist
In defending the principle of neutrality, liberals have often appealed to a more general moral principle that forbids coercing persons in the name of reasons those persons themselves cannot reasonably be expected to share. Yet liberals have struggled to articulate a non-arbitrary, non-dogmatic disti...
Main Author: | Lendell Horne |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Université de Montréal
2009-06-01
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Series: | Les Ateliers de l’Ethique |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://creum.umontreal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/pdf_12_Horne.pdf |
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