Analysis of the Brazilian tax incentives to innovation and patent data: a Principal-Agent model approach

• Main Authors: Felippe Clemente, Evaldo Henrique da Silva
• Format: Article
• Language: Spanish
• Published: Universidad Católica de Colombia 2021-08-01
• Series: Revista Finanzas y Política Económica
• Subjects: “Lei do Bem”; Principal-Agent model; Innovation
• Online Access: https://revfinypolecon.ucatolica.edu.co/article/view/3424

We propose to evaluate Lei do Bem (law 11.196/05) for Brazilian regions (North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast and South). This is the first study that analyzes Lei do Bem using extensive game simulations for the different regions of the country. Based on data from 2006 to 2015, we find moral hazard between government and innovative Brazilian companies, as there was no express incentive in the Lei do Bem to stimulate the industrial sector to innovate and register the innovation as a patent. Thus, policies that review the tax incentives structure contained in the Lei do Bem as well as encourage industries and companies to file patents in public patent databases may have positive effects on the Brazilian innovation system.