SUBJECTION AND RECOGNIZABILITY: AGAINST RECOGNITION’S INNOCENCE IN AXEL HONNETH

<p>This article presents a critical reading of Axel Honneth’s work “Recognition as ideology” (2006), built upon Judith Butler’s theory of subjection. It attempts to show that because of not considering here enough the dimension of power, the German thinker does not confront successfully the st...

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Main Author: Jacinta Gorriti
Format: Article
Language:Spanish
Published: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2015-06-01
Series:Astrolabio: Nueva Época
Subjects:
Online Access:http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/astrolabio/article/view/10804
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spelling doaj-1d331d0d237a4d9995df22433ff81f652020-11-25T01:34:50ZspaUniversidad Nacional de CórdobaAstrolabio: Nueva Época1668-75152015-06-01014285010246SUBJECTION AND RECOGNIZABILITY: AGAINST RECOGNITION’S INNOCENCE IN AXEL HONNETHJacinta Gorriti0Universidad Nacional de Córdoba<p>This article presents a critical reading of Axel Honneth’s work “Recognition as ideology” (2006), built upon Judith Butler’s theory of subjection. It attempts to show that because of not considering here enough the dimension of power, the German thinker does not confront successfully the stances that question recognition’s critical potential. This work suggests that such an absence is linked to Honneth’s definition of recognition as being the opposite of practices of domination or subordination. However, Honneth affirms that these skeptical stances are based on the idea that every recognitional praxis reproduces in some way the dominating social order. This article offers then, a critical look upon this idea, warning that an analysis about the way power works on daily recognition practices does not necessarily entail a resignation of the critical function of recognition. More likely, as the Butlerian (and Foucauldian) notion of <em>critique</em> suggests, only by framing recognition in the normative horizon that defines it, it can become the basis of social inquiry.</p>http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/astrolabio/article/view/10804reconocimientosujecióndominiopodercrítica
collection DOAJ
language Spanish
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Jacinta Gorriti
spellingShingle Jacinta Gorriti
SUBJECTION AND RECOGNIZABILITY: AGAINST RECOGNITION’S INNOCENCE IN AXEL HONNETH
Astrolabio: Nueva Época
reconocimiento
sujeción
dominio
poder
crítica
author_facet Jacinta Gorriti
author_sort Jacinta Gorriti
title SUBJECTION AND RECOGNIZABILITY: AGAINST RECOGNITION’S INNOCENCE IN AXEL HONNETH
title_short SUBJECTION AND RECOGNIZABILITY: AGAINST RECOGNITION’S INNOCENCE IN AXEL HONNETH
title_full SUBJECTION AND RECOGNIZABILITY: AGAINST RECOGNITION’S INNOCENCE IN AXEL HONNETH
title_fullStr SUBJECTION AND RECOGNIZABILITY: AGAINST RECOGNITION’S INNOCENCE IN AXEL HONNETH
title_full_unstemmed SUBJECTION AND RECOGNIZABILITY: AGAINST RECOGNITION’S INNOCENCE IN AXEL HONNETH
title_sort subjection and recognizability: against recognition’s innocence in axel honneth
publisher Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
series Astrolabio: Nueva Época
issn 1668-7515
publishDate 2015-06-01
description <p>This article presents a critical reading of Axel Honneth’s work “Recognition as ideology” (2006), built upon Judith Butler’s theory of subjection. It attempts to show that because of not considering here enough the dimension of power, the German thinker does not confront successfully the stances that question recognition’s critical potential. This work suggests that such an absence is linked to Honneth’s definition of recognition as being the opposite of practices of domination or subordination. However, Honneth affirms that these skeptical stances are based on the idea that every recognitional praxis reproduces in some way the dominating social order. This article offers then, a critical look upon this idea, warning that an analysis about the way power works on daily recognition practices does not necessarily entail a resignation of the critical function of recognition. More likely, as the Butlerian (and Foucauldian) notion of <em>critique</em> suggests, only by framing recognition in the normative horizon that defines it, it can become the basis of social inquiry.</p>
topic reconocimiento
sujeción
dominio
poder
crítica
url http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/astrolabio/article/view/10804
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