Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games

Abstract In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092, 2014), we prove an existence theorem. As an application,...

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Main Author:	Jinlu Li
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	SpringerOpen 2018-04-01
Series:	Fixed Point Theory and Applications
Subjects:	Repeated game Infinitely split Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium Fixed point theorem on posets
Online Access:	http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13663-018-0636-1

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spelling	doaj-1cbe457bda134e6d89448e8ec65953302020-11-25T01:57:59ZengSpringerOpenFixed Point Theory and Applications1687-18122018-04-012018111610.1186/s13663-018-0636-1Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated gamesJinlu Li0Department of Mathematics, Shawnee State UniversityAbstract In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092, 2014), we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition.http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13663-018-0636-1Repeated gameInfinitely split Nash equilibriumNash equilibriumFixed point theorem on posets
collection	DOAJ
language	English
format	Article
sources	DOAJ
author	Jinlu Li
spellingShingle	Jinlu Li Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games Fixed Point Theory and Applications Repeated game Infinitely split Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium Fixed point theorem on posets
author_facet	Jinlu Li
author_sort	Jinlu Li
title	Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
title_short	Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
title_full	Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
title_fullStr	Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
title_full_unstemmed	Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
title_sort	infinitely split nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
publisher	SpringerOpen
series	Fixed Point Theory and Applications
issn	1687-1812
publishDate	2018-04-01
description	Abstract In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092, 2014), we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition.
topic	Repeated game Infinitely split Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium Fixed point theorem on posets
url	http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13663-018-0636-1
work_keys_str_mv	AT jinluli infinitelysplitnashequilibriumproblemsinrepeatedgames
_version_	1715614222407172096

Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games

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