The Authority of Reflection
Richard Moran defends the irreducible authority of the first-person in a deliberative perspective. This article argues that authority of self-reflection is best understood as a relation of mutual recognition between self and others, hence from a second-person stance.
Main Author: | Carla Bagnoli |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
University of the Basque Country
2009-12-01
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Series: | THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/481 |
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