Philosophical Issues of Semantics Raised by L.A. Novikov as a Key to Creating the Terminology Apparatus of Legal Linguistics (Category of Intentiuon)

• Main Authors: Valentina A Maslova, Anton A Lavitski
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University) 2019-12-01
• Series: RUDN Journal of Language Studies, Semiotics and Semantics
• Subjects: l.a. novikov; semantics; legal linguistics; integrativity; intentionality; motive; deliberateness
• Online Access: http://journals.rudn.ru/semiotics-semantics/article/viewFile/22115/17356

In the late 20th century, in linguistics, inevitable changes were felt which were connected with the necessity in the transition of the science about language onto an absolutely new stage of its development. L.A. Novikov was one of the first among those who understood it. In the 80-s of the previous century he presented a new idea of semantics with deep philosophic understanding of its problem field, with the aspiration to seek solutions through the language interdisciplinary links. For the contemporary linguistics L.A. Novikov’s approaches are evident; however, they are not deprived of urgency and can become a clue to the solution of many problems especially in the field of terminology studies. In the present paper, on the basis of L.A. Novikov’s theory, an attempt is made to give the definition for the category of intentionality from the point of view of legal linguistics since the application of the available in the theory of law ideas for the new integrated direction is already insufficient. Legal linguistics has entered the development phase when there is an urgent necessity in shaping its own terminological vocabulary. This process can’t be “closed” and be limited by the approaches of the theory of law and theory of language: the shaping of the notion apparatus must be based on the ideas available in philosophy, psychology, physiology, education etc. This understanding of the problem finds its reflection in the present paper which makes it possible to define intentionality as a form of the implementation of the deliberateness of the act which is determined by the motive.