Physical Determinability
I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specific...
Main Author: | Sophie C. Gibb |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente
2015-12-01
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Series: | Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/68 |
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