Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from Romania

The process of administrative decentralization of the education system in Romania proceeded in chaotic steps. It was done under the pressure, on one hand, of the EU integration requirements and, on the other hand, of the local administrations who wanted more control over how their money were used in...

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Main Author: Gabriel Marian Cosmin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Sciendo 2018-06-01
Series:Central European Journal of Public Policy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.2478/cejpp-2018-0003
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spelling doaj-190d98bd24eb49298e6168a16b38a9fa2021-09-06T19:22:03ZengSciendoCentral European Journal of Public Policy1802-48662018-06-01121324010.2478/cejpp-2018-0003cejpp-2018-0003Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from RomaniaGabriel Marian Cosmin0Babeș-Bolyai University, Political Science Department.The process of administrative decentralization of the education system in Romania proceeded in chaotic steps. It was done under the pressure, on one hand, of the EU integration requirements and, on the other hand, of the local administrations who wanted more control over how their money were used in the schools and of the parents committees that wanted to have a say in the local schools. The road was scattered with new reform legislations coming with every change in government composition and ministers. The result was a combination of local autonomy and central control that had the potential to produce confusion and conflict. The multiple and complex blend of divided responsibilities and powers turned out in the process of setting up the new form or entry grade in the Romanian primary education cycle in a rational strategic play scholarly designated as anticommons. Each separated actor tries to obtain a maximizing share of the cooperatively generated benefit for a minimum possible cost. The interactions are modeled as a Game of Chicken where, because actors calculate separately, each selects a higher price/lower quantity position than is optimal, resulting in a lower net payoff both individually and collectively.https://doi.org/10.2478/cejpp-2018-0003anticommonsrational tragediesstrategic holdupnon-cooperative gameseducation reformdecentralization
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Gabriel Marian Cosmin
spellingShingle Gabriel Marian Cosmin
Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from Romania
Central European Journal of Public Policy
anticommons
rational tragedies
strategic holdup
non-cooperative games
education reform
decentralization
author_facet Gabriel Marian Cosmin
author_sort Gabriel Marian Cosmin
title Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from Romania
title_short Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from Romania
title_full Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from Romania
title_fullStr Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from Romania
title_full_unstemmed Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from Romania
title_sort education in the anticommons: evidence from romania
publisher Sciendo
series Central European Journal of Public Policy
issn 1802-4866
publishDate 2018-06-01
description The process of administrative decentralization of the education system in Romania proceeded in chaotic steps. It was done under the pressure, on one hand, of the EU integration requirements and, on the other hand, of the local administrations who wanted more control over how their money were used in the schools and of the parents committees that wanted to have a say in the local schools. The road was scattered with new reform legislations coming with every change in government composition and ministers. The result was a combination of local autonomy and central control that had the potential to produce confusion and conflict. The multiple and complex blend of divided responsibilities and powers turned out in the process of setting up the new form or entry grade in the Romanian primary education cycle in a rational strategic play scholarly designated as anticommons. Each separated actor tries to obtain a maximizing share of the cooperatively generated benefit for a minimum possible cost. The interactions are modeled as a Game of Chicken where, because actors calculate separately, each selects a higher price/lower quantity position than is optimal, resulting in a lower net payoff both individually and collectively.
topic anticommons
rational tragedies
strategic holdup
non-cooperative games
education reform
decentralization
url https://doi.org/10.2478/cejpp-2018-0003
work_keys_str_mv AT gabrielmariancosmin educationintheanticommonsevidencefromromania
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