Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsg...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of the Basque Country
2010-01-01
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| Series: | THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science |
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| Online Access: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/592 |
| Summary: | In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism. |
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| ISSN: | 0495-4548 2171-679X |