Short-term deviations from monetary policy commitment in a monetary union: the degrees of freedom of an independent central bank
The paper presents a model analyzing the degrees of freedom of an independent but committed Central Bank within a monetary union. In the model, interactions between Agents, Supranational Political Authorities and the Central Bank of the Union determine the current nominal and real outcomes. Imperfec...
Main Authors: | Muriel Dal-Pont, Dominique Torre, Elise Tosi |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Coimbra University Press
2016-09-01
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Series: | Notas Económicas |
Online Access: | https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3664 |
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