Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions
Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability (understood as an angry mood) and apprehension (understood as a fearful mood), which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand ha...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
2006-01-01
|
| Series: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/135314 |
| Summary: | Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability (understood as an angry mood) and apprehension (understood as a fearful mood), which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not as generalised emotions, but as states of vigilance; and I argue that, on this model, moods should be regarded as intentional states of a kind quite distinct from emotions. An advantage of this account is that it allows us to distinguish between a mood of apprehension and an episode of objectless fear. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1845-8475 1849-0514 |